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Preface
The first Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I) to the Republic of Korea in the amount of
US$2 billion was approved on March 26, 1998, and made effective and disbursed on March 27,
1998. The loan closed on August 31, 1998, which was the original closing date.
SAL I was the second in a sequence of adjustment operations. This ICR covers the period
beginning with prior actions for SAL I and leading up to the prior actions for SAL II. This
convention is the same as in the ICR for the Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL). The ICR for
ERL covered events and policies relating to the program up to the effectiveness of ERL and its
immediate aftermath, and, therefore reviewed many of the prior actions for SAL I.
This Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was prepared by Richard Carroll as a desk
assignment, based on interviews with staff and materials from the project file. Mr. Homi Kharas
was the Sector Manager. Messrs. Sri-Ram Aiyer (Country Director and Task Manager for the
loan) and Zia Qureshi (Deputy Task Manager for the loan, EACKO) had overall responsibility for
monitoring the policy matrix for the first Structural Adjustment Loan. Messrs. Nicholas Prescott
(EASHD), Douglas Webb (LEGPS), David Scott (SFO), Robert Holzmann (HDNSP), Behdad
Nowroozi (EAPCO), Gerry Meyerman (PSDBE), Klaus Lorch (EASPS), Stijn Claessens
(FSPEU), and Clifford Garstang (LEGEA) provided comments for the ICR. Messrs. Aiyer and
Qureshi reviewed the report.
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Evaluation Summary1
Project Origin, Objectives and Description
1. The first Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I - Loan No. 4302-KO) for $2 billion was the
second in a series of Bank lending operations in Korea to provide assistance in dealing with the
economic crisis. SAL I was the immediate follow-up operation to the $3 billion Economic
Reconstruction Loan (ERL). SAL I was approved by the Board on March 26, 1998, became
effective, and was fully disbursed on the following day. The objectives of SAL I were to: (1)
provide assistance for Korea's immediate foreign exchange crisis; and (2) support a program of
major structural reforms in the financial and real sectors to lay the basis for Korea's eventual
return to strong and sustained growth in the context of today's more integrated and competitive
global economy.
2. Korea made substantial progress in the aftermath of ERL in its stabilization and structural
reform program. In addition to avoiding default, between December 1997 and February 1998,
the exchange rate appreciated almost 20 percent, the stock market recovered 45 percent, and
usable reserves increased to $18.5 billion from a low of $4 billion. The drafting of a debt
restructuring agreement in January 1998 with major New York creditor banks eased pressure on
Korea's external financial position and increased financial market confidence in Korea's
economy.
3. The framework for recovery in Korea supported by SAL I was broad and deep, aiming at
the major structural weaknesses in the economy, including those in financial, corporate and
social sectors. The Government's framework for structural reforms, supported by SAL I, was
specified in the Government's Letter of Development Policy of February 27, 1998. The
framework consisted of four elements: (1) financial sector reform; (2) corporate sector reform;
(3) the labor market and social safety nets; and (4) economic management and institutions.
Substantial progress was made in all of these areas under SAL I.
4. The SAL I reform framework intensified the shift in incentives away from corporate and
financial policies that precipitated the crisis. ERL identified the major distortions in the
1 The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the first Structural Adjustmnent Loan (SAL I) covers policies and events in Korea relating to
the loan prior to SAL I effectiveness and leading up to the implementation of the follow-up loan, the second Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL
II) which was approved by the Board on October 23, 1998.
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economy, including the excessive corporate leveraging to diversify holdings, weak corporate
governance, subsidized interest rates and a captive financial sector. SAL I supported a range of
specific reforms to address these distortions. In the financial sector, the government committed
to formulating a plan to resolve financial sector distress and establish the basis for a sound,
efficient financial system in the future. In the corporate sector, the success of restructuring
depended on transparency and a competitive framework. SAL I pursued the strengthening of
shareholder rights and of the boards of directors of Korean companies. Improved accounting and
audit functions would enhance transparency and provide better and earlier signals of potential
future crises. Revamped competition policies, including a more powerful Korean Fair Trade
Commission (KFTC) and significant liberalization of foreign investment regulations, would
improve Korean corporations' ability to prosper in domestic and international markets.
5. Rigidities in the Korean labor market, in particular the inability to lay off workers, made
corporate restructuring difficult. SAL I sought to make the labor markets more flexible by
making layoffs feasible for corporations. To soften the impact of this move and to cushion the
poor from the crisis, SAL I contained measures to improve and expand the social safety net for
released workers, including retirees, and to strengthen poverty targeted programs.
6. Loan Pricing. SAL I pricing was non-standard and its negotiation led to some delay of
loan effectiveness. Two considerations dictated a higher than standard price: (i) the increased
risk posed by the Korean economic crisis; and (ii) the Bank's need to set aside substantial
reserves/provisions against the large SAL I, which reduced the Bank's net income. (At the time of
SAL I approval, the standard SAL interest rate was 50 basis points above the Bank's cost of borrowing,
with no upfront service charge). The features of the SAL I pricing were:
* Interest rate--6-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR plus 0.75 percent
* Upfront fee--i .5 percent of principal at effectiveness
* Term-- 15 years
* Grace period--5 years
* Ineligibility for waivers of interest or commitment charges
Implementation Experience and Results
Macroeconomic Results
7. An indication of the impact of the recovery program under SAL I is the general
macroeconomic developments between SAL I and SAL II effectiveness (October 23, 1998). There
was progress on stabilization, with the exchange rate appreciating from W1,600/$ to W1,360/$, a
revised current account surplus estimate for 1998 of $40 billion (13 percent of GDP), an increase in
gross usable reserves to over $40 billion, a greatly improved term structure of external debt with
short-term debt reduced to $32.5 billion (compared with $63.2 billion at the end of 1997 and $93.0
billion at the end of 1996), and an inflation rate around 4 percent. On the negative side, GDP is
estimated to have contracted by 5.8 percent in 1998 and unemployment to have risen to 7.9
percent (end of year) compared with 3 percent before the crisis. While the recession was worse
than initially expected, in general, the macroeconomy, supported by SAL I, was able to reverse
several key negative trends and reduce the threat of default: the rising current account surplus,
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increasing usable reserves, increasing rollover ratio for external debt, and reduced interest rates.
The ground was laid for economic recovery.
Structural Reforms
8. Financial sector. Key actions with respect to remedying financial sector distress
included developing a comprehensive resolution strategy. This included arranging for diagnostic
reviews to be performed in all commercial banks, and taking appropriate enforcement action
where banks were found to be undercapitalized (closure/merger/recapitalization/restructuring).
Government agreed to evaluate the remaining merchant banks and close those that were not
viable. Steps were initiated toward the privatization of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank. To lay
the groundwork for a stronger financial system, the government agreed to improve the regulatory
framework for all financial institutions, including strengthening prudential regulations. To
upgrade financial sector supervision, the government embarked upon a comprehensive
institutional capacity program for the new, combined supervisory agency, the Financial
Supervisory Service (FSS). Steps were taken to promote capital market development, in part by
strengthening the government and corporate bond markets, liberalizing the equity markets,
promoting institutional investors and strengthening market infrastructure.
9. Corporate Sector. SAL I continued progress in the areas of governance with more
specific reforms of the roles of boards of directors, the insolvency framework, and financial
transparency and accountability. There were early gains in financial disclosure which paved the
way for corporate reform and helped restore some confidence by the external market. Further
improvement in financial disclosure and transparency lagged in the middle part of 1998, but
gained momentum leading up to SAL II. Achievement of objectives was reasonably good with
respect to governance and the competition framework, but also lagged in mid-1998. Measures to
improve governance included:
* mandating that at least 25 percent of boards be comprised of outside directors.
* lowering the threshold for exercising minority shareholder rights, for example to file a
shareholders' representative suit from 1 to 0.05 percent of outstanding shares (and later
reduced to 0.01 percent), and for inspection rights from 3 to 1 percent. Thresholds for
inspecting company records and calling shareholders' meetings were further reduced.
* new bankruptcy laws that empowered courts to freeze assets within two weeks of a filing for
the purpose of providing fair treatment for creditors. Courts could also impose a one year
limit on reorganizations.
* Bankruptcy Act gave district courts authority over involuntary bankruptcy and composition
and reorganization procedures that were formerly divided
* Reorganization Act: expedited the process by setting deadlines, promoting courts' expertise
by creating an administrative body, and enhancing creditors' role by creating a creditors'
committee.
* The Composition Act strengthened the implementation process by introducing an
administrator of asset preservation, imposing on debtors the obligation to report on
implementation, and requiring evaluation of debtors' implementation by creditors.
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10. Improving financial reporting and disclosure. Although ERL supported some
improvements, the accounting and auditing profession still needed fundamental reform to achieve
financial transparency and reliability. Important specific measures included:
* Commitment to establish an independent accounting standards setting body and strengthen
KICPA's role in issuing auditing standards, monitoring professional quality, and enforcing a
code of conduct.
* Commitment to preparation and audit of financial statements of listed companies, banks, and
other financial institutions in accordance with accounting and auditing standards that are
consistent with international best practices starting with the reporting year 1999.
* Issuance of implementing rules for consolidated financial statements for majority owned
companies and combined financial statements for all major commonly controlled companies
starting in 1999 (originally slated for the year 2000).
* Completion of the study on introducing audit committees of boards of directors with the goal
of upgrading the audit selection committee to an independent and transparent audit committee
of boards of directors.
* The External Audit of Joint Stock Corporations Act which accelerated the introduction of
consolidated financial statements for corporate groups from the year 2000 to 1999, and
required an audit selection committee for listed companies and affiliates of large business
groups.
11. Competition Policy. Significant prior actions were taken, but partially undermined later
by the quality of implementation. It is not clear whether the KFTC has been able to enforce
adequately the new, pro-competition regulations (relating to fair trade and mergers and
acquisitions) supported by SAL I. Performance on competition policy lagged after SAL I
effectiveness and before fulfillment of SAL II prior conditions. Major prior conditions included:
* Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act: permits takeovers of non-
strategic companies by foreign investors without government approval, and raises the foreign
stock ownership ceiling without approval by the Board of Directors from 10 percent to 33
percent.
* Corporation Tax Act: advances removal of the tax exemption regarding interest costs of
excessive borrowings as losses and expenses from year 2002 to 2000.
* Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Act: provides tax breaks for restructuring of firms,
including exemption of SMEs from capital gains tax on sale of real estate used to repay debt
to financial institutions, and on transfers of real estate through M&A.
* Antitrust and Fair Trade Act: prohibits any new cross debt guarantees and eliminates all
existing cross debt guarantees by the end of March, 2000.
12. Labor Markets/Social Safety Nets. SAL I substantially broadened the ERL program,
laying out specific measures in three areas: the labor market, anti-poverty and pensions. Major
measures to improve labor market functioning included:
v* Expansion of unemployment insurance coverage to firms with five or more workers.
* The Labor Standards Act which allows firms to make layoffs under M&As and to avoid
financial difficulties.
* The Act relating to Protection for Dispatched Workers which introduces manpower leasing
services for jobs requiring professional knowledge, skills and experience (a Presidential
Decree later limited the application of manpower leasing to 26 occupations, however).
13. Poverty and support to the unemployed. To reduce the impact of the crisis on the
poor, the GOK committed to at least maintaining constant real per beneficiary public expenditures
on targeted poverty programs, and made adequate budget allocations. Additional measures
included:
* The Basic Employment Policy Act authorizing the Ministry of Labor to implement
unemployment measures, including vocational training to promote employment and financial
support to cover living costs and medical care costs for the unemployed.
* The Employment Insurance Act reducing minimum contribution period from 12 to 6 months
temporarily until June 30, 1999; and increasing the minimum duration of benefit period to 60
days and minimum amount of Job Search Allowance from 50 to 70 percent of minimum wage.
* The Wage Claim Guarantee Act entitling those laid off at bankrupt firms with more than five
workers to a sum equal to three months' pay plus three years' severance pay from a state-
managed compensation fund, financed by employers' contribution, from July 1, 1998.
14. Pensions. SAL I pursued both short and long-run objectives for the pension system, as
well as social and financial. The short-run plan was to ensure adequate protection for those hurt
by the crisis. The long-run plan was to ensure fiscal soundness of the pension system well into the
next century. One of SAL I's major initiatives was to ensure protection for the elderly poor
through a means-tested, non-contributory social pension for the elderly. To improve the
management of pension funds, forced government borrowing and directed credits from pension
fund reserves had to be phased out. Several measures were instituted to pave the way for
investing the pension fund in other assets, and enhancing professionalism in pension fund
management. One important step identified was to move toward a secondary market for the
government securities that the NPS might hold.
15. In summary, most of the objectives of SAL I were accomplished by the closing date, with
most of the major policy actions implemented prior to SAL I Board presentation. SAL I should
be viewed as part of a broader, longer-term series of efforts to stabilize the Korean economy and
return it to a path of sustainable growth. The overall assessement of SAL I is satisfactory
Bank Performance
16. Although the Bank experienced obstacles in concluding SAL I negotiations, it succeeded
in substantially advancing the reform program and in rapidly providing balance of payments
assistance. On a compressed timetable, the Bank, with other donors and the GOK, specified
conditions to address major areas of stabilization and structural reform. The Bank also effectively
supported the IF efforts by stressing the importance of an effective macro-economic
vi
stabilization plan and a medium-term structural reform framework as essential conditions for
Board presentation of SAL I, and by closely monitoring the measures in the policy matrix-
Major features of Bank performance include:
* The Bank/GOK reform program achieved substantial progress in most, if not all, areas of
structural reform through the Board conditions for SAL I.
* The Bank rapidly pursued a follow-up operation to ERL.
* Some elements of the reform program had to be watered down in order to achieve a quick
liquidity transfer.
* The Bank did not explicitly state the higher than standard SAL pricing until the negotiation
stage.
* The Bank approved a relatively large TA loan ($48 million) to support the implementation of
the SAL I program.
Future Operations
17. The second Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL II) was the immediate follow-up operation,
effective October 23, 1998. SAL II ($2 billion) was a two tranche loan to support Government
efforts to deepen structural reform in the financial and corporate sectors and further strengthen
social safety nets.
Lessons Learned
18. SAL I built on the ERL, and many of the lessons learned under ERL apply to SAL I as
well. These lessons are briefly summarized in section I (see ICR for ERL for more detail).
Lessons from SAL I are:
* The costs of preparing a loan on a highly compressed timetable. The scarcity of time for
loan preparation can lead to oversights that lead to a net delay in the final analysis. Under
SAL I, the Bank intended to charge a higher than standard price for SAL I. While there were
reasons for the Koreans to expect a higher price, there was no explicit indication that the
Bank intended to do so. As a result, the Koreans' had a basis to balk at the agreement which
led to nearly a one month delay in conclusion of negotiations. That delay was inefficient
because that time could have been better employed on the substance of the SAL I program
rather than bargaining over the price of the loan. As a result of the further negotiations, the
Koreans managed to lower the interest rate by 25 basis points. A more important cost was
the lack of time to achieve government ownership on more contentious reform elements such
as the audit reforms.
* Beginning policy discussions with the top policy makers. It is advisable to initiate
adjustment negotiations with senior policy makers who are actually in a position to decide
on, or to know about feasible reform commitments. Under SAL I, a fair amount of time was
lost in early discussions with technical people who were not in a position to advance policy
discussions with the Bank team.
vii
The Bank and the Fund and a unified front. The negotiating positions of both the Bank
and the IMF are weakened when their positions are not fully consistent. Borrowing countries
can easily detect inconsistencies, especially in the midst of simultaneous negotiations in the
same policy areas, and can play one institution against the other. One example was the
external audit reforms where the Bank had to accept a less than full commitment.
Single vs. double tranche approach. A single tranche policy-based operation (such as SAL
I), with strong up-front actions prior to Board approval, is an effective way to quickly transfer
liquidity in urgent situations. The single tranche instrument is best used when the economic
situation is volatile, as in SAL I, where the longer term rigidity of second tranche conditions
could be disadvantageous. However, single tranche operations offer only a 2 to 3 month
window to accomplish reforms. After disbursement, reforms, as in SAL I, may well lag until
the next operation's prospect of fund release. Two tranche operations offer a longer period to
enact reforms and carry the stronger incentive of tranche release conditions, as opposed to
"monitorable indicators." Administratively, it is cheaper to have one two tranche rather than
two single tranche operations.
* One to one on site guidance through reforms. Slippage in reforms may occur due to a
borrower's unfamiliarity with the economics behind the reforms, as in the case of the risk of
further concentrating industry through "Big Deals". A seminar on competitive policies is a
good way to have government ownership of an increasing competition culture. TA projects
may be too slow in matching infusions of technical guidance with actual implementation in a
timely way. Assessment of upfront loan fees argues for abundant upfront provision of this type
of assistance.
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PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. Objectives, Background and Description
Objectives
1. The first Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I - Loan No. 4302-KO) for $2 billion was the
second Bank lending operation in Korea in a series to provide assistance in dealing with the
economic crisis. SAL I was the immediate follow-up operation to the $3 billion Economic
Reconstruction Loan (ERL). SAL I was approved by the Board on March 26, 1998, became
effective, and was fully disbursed on the following day. The objectives of SAL I were to: (1)
provide assistance for Korea's immediate foreign exchange crisis; and (2) support a program of
major structural reforms in the financial and real sectors to lay the basis for Korea's eventual
return to strong and sustained growth in the context of today's more integrated and competitive
global economy.
Background
2. SAL I followed only three months behind the ERL, and was another large loan to
maintain momentum in restoring investor confidence, but also to develop specific measures
under the broad reform framework agreed on under ERL. The quick follow-up loan was part of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bank strategy to frontload the $57 billion rescue
package in order to prevent Korea from slipping backward to the edge of default. The Bank and
GOK prepared SAL I in close cooperation with the IMF.
3. From the December 4, 1997 announcement of the rescue package through SAL I
effectiveness, the Bank had already disbursed $5 billion of the (up to) $10 billion pledged, the
IMF had disbursed $13 of $21 billion and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), $3 of $4 billion.
The "second line of defense" by G-7 countries in the event of a second wave of the crisis, part of
the total $57 billion rescue package, has not been activated to date.
4. Korea made substantial progress after ERL effectiveness under its stabilization and
structural reform program. In addition to avoiding default, Korea further stabilized the economy,
and initiated a medium term framework for continued recovery. On the macro side, the exchange
rate appreciated almost 20 percent, the stock market recovered 45 percent, and usable reserves
increased to $18.5 billion by the end of February from a low of $4 billion in December. The
drafting of a debt restructuring agreement in January 1998 with major New York creditor banks
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eased pressure on Korea's external financial position and increased financial market confidence
in Korea's economy. Additional details of macroeconomic developments leading up to SAL I
are summarized in the Implementation Completion Report for ERL. Developments after SAL7
effectiveness are found in Section B below.
5. The framework for recovery aimed to restructure the Korean economy in a way consistent
with a more integrated and competitive global economy. SAL I followed the first Bank response
to the crisis (ERL) and aimed at resolving underlying structural weaknesses in the economy. As
part of the reform agenda supported by SAL I, the Government of Korea (GOK) committed to a
medium term framework and undertook a large number of financial, corporate and social sector
reforms. Section B below reviews these reforms, many of which were actions required for Board
presentation of SAL I (see also Annex B: Prior Actions for SAL I).
6. SAL I was initiated shortly after the December 19, 1997 national election, which the
government in power lost. SAL I was prepared and negotiated during a transition phase with
both the outgoing and incoming governments. Difficult reforms were discussed in a tripartite
forum of government officials, and business and labor leaders. That the new government was
elected as a reform government was considered a boost to developing and implementing a reform
program with strong measures.
Description
7. Program elements. The Government's framework for structural reforms, supported by
SAL I, was specified in the Government's Letter of Development Policy on February 27, 1998
which was signed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economy (see
President's report P-7225-KO March 19, 1998, Annex 1). The framework consisted of four
elements: (1) financial sector reform; (2) corporate sector reform; (3) the labor market and social
safety nets; and (4) economic management and institutions. The corporate sector reform element
included reforms in corporate governance and competition policies. The IMF took the lead on
macroeconomic stabilization measures, as well as trade policy and capital account liberalization.
The Bank and the IMF worked together on the financial sector with specific areas of
responsibility dictated by each institution's comparative advantage. The Bank led in corporate
sector reform and labor markets and social protection.
8. The general framework for the future reform program (to be supported by SALs) was
agreed prior to Board presentation. The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) was outlined in the
SAL I President's report. (A formal CAS is being prepared.) The strategy addressed the key
structural weaknesses of the Korean economy, especially in the financial and corporate sectors,
while simultaneously addressing short and long-term social issues. With the establishment of the
policy framework supported by SAL I, the Government met the broad conditions to justify Bank
support of $2 billion as part of a total program of lending up to US$10 billion for a two to three-
year period. Annex B lists actions required for SAL I Board presentation. Annex C presents the
status of policy actions leading up to SAL II (October 1998).
9. The SAL I reform frarnework intensified the shift in incentives away from corporate and
financial policies that precipitated the crisis. ERL identified the major distortions in the
economy, including the excessive corporate leveraging to diversify holdings, weak corporate
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governance, subsidized interest rates and a captive financial sector. SAL I helped to correct these
distortions in the financial and corporate sectors through major policy actions.
10. Financial sector reforms. Under SAL I the government committed to formulating a
plan to resolve financial sector distress and establish the basis for a sound, efficient financial
system in the future. Key actions with respect to remedying financial sector distress included
developing a comprehensive resolution strategy. As part of this strategy, government agreed to
proceed with the privatization of Korea First and Seoul Bank. They were to arrange for
diagnostic reviews to be performed in all commercial banks, and take appropriate enforcement
action where banks were found to be undercapitalized. Government agreed to evaluate the
remaining merchant banks and close those that were not viable. Asset purchases by KAMCO
were to take place only in the context of approved recapitalization and rehabilitation plans. Asset
purchases were to be made at market value.
11. To lay the groundwork for a stronger financial system, the government agreed to improve
the regulatory framework for all financial institutions, including strengthening prudential
regulations. They were to upgrade financial sector supervision by embarking upon a
comprehensive institutional capacity program for the new, combined supervisory agency, the
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). Capital market development was to be promoted, in part
by strengthening the govermment and corporate bond markets, liberalizing the equity markets,
promoting institutional investors and strengthening market infrastructure.
12. Corporate reforms. The success of restructuring depended on transparency and a
competitive framework. SAL I pursued the strengthening of shareholder rights and of the boards
of directors of Korean companies. With greater participation of shareholders and directors,
business decisions would be made for the benefit of the company rather than the elite groups that
controlled the companies. Improved accounting and audit functions would enhance transparency
and provide better and earlier signals of potential future crises. Revamped competition policies,
including a more powerful Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and significant liberalization
of foreign investment regulations, would improve Korean corporations' ability to prosper in
domestic and international markets.
13. Labor markets and social safety nets. Rigidities in the Korean labor market, in
particular the inability to lay off workers, made corporate restructuring difficult. SAL I sought to
make the labor markets more flexible by making layoffs feasible for corporations. To soften the
impact of this move and to cushion the poor from the crisis, SAL I contained measures to
improve and expand the social safety net for released workers, including retirees, and to
strengthen poverty targeted programs.
14. Special issue of non-standard loan pricing. SAL I pricing, although considerably
lower than that of ERL, was higher than that of a standard SAL. Essentially two considerations
dictated a higher price: (i) the increased risk posed by the Korean economic crisis; and (ii) the
Bank's need to set aside substantial reserves/provisions against the large SAL I, which reduced
the Bank's net income. After intensive and protracted negotiations, SAL I pricing was only
moderately higher than that of a standard SAL at final loan agreement. The features of the SAL I
pricing were:
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* Interest rate--6-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR plus 0.75 percent
* Upfront fee-- 1.5 percent of principal at effectiveness
* Term--15 years
* Grace period--5 years
* Ineligibility for waivers of interest or commitment charges
15. At the time of SAL I approval, the standard SAL interest rate was 50 basis points above
the Bank's cost of borrowing, with no upfront service charge. (At the time of this ICR, the
standard SAL interest rate is 75 basis points above the Bank's borrowing cost, and there is a 1.0
percent upfront service charge-effective July 1998).
B. Achievement of Objectives
Recent Macroeconomic Performance and Stabilization Results
16. Korea's economy has stabilized further. Shortly after ERL disbursed, in early to mid-
January, Korea was still in danger of sinking into default, but development of a framework to
restructure Korea's short-term extemal debt helped calm financial markets. Still, it was not until
banks gradually signed on to the debt restructuring agreement, by April, that Korea's debt
situation actually began to stabilize. As the financial situation stabilized, monetary policy was
eased to pursue further interest rate reductions that were consistent with exchange rate stability.
With the advantage of low public debt, fiscal policy could also be relaxed to bolster domestic
demand.
Table 1 Selected Economic Indicators
Real GDP % change 8.9 6.8 5.0 -5.8 4.5
Gross domestic inv.-% of GDP 37.2 37.9 34.2 20.9 27.1
Gross national saving.-% of GDP 35.4 33.5 32.5 33.4 32.3
CPI-end period 4.7 4.9 6.6 392.0
Terms of trade -3.5 -11.7 -11.4 1.8 -3.1
Gov't budget balance % of GDP 0.3 0.3 0.3 -3.1 -5.2
Reserve money growth 16.3 -12.2 -12.5 -8.1 19.8
Balance of Payments-US$ billion
Exports, f.o.b. 124.6 130.0 138.6 131.8 134.3
Imports, f.o.b. -129.1 -144.9 -141.8 -90.6 -106.0
Current Acct. Balance -8.5 -23.0 -8.2 40.0 20.4
Usable reserves-months 2.2 2.0 0.6 5.1 6.5
External Debt-Total-US$ billion 119.7 164.3 158.1 149.3 132.8
of which Short-term 78.7 93.0 63.2 30.8 27.2
ExtemalDebt-%ofGDP 24.5 31.6 33.2 46.6 33.9
Source: IMF
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17. Positive macroeconomic developments between SAL I and SAL II effectiveness (October
23, 1998) include progress on stabilization of the exchange rate from around W1,600/$ to
W1,360/$, and a revised current account surplus estimate for 1998 up to $40 billion (13 percenIl
of GDP), mainly due to compression of imports, but with some export volume response. In
addition, there was an increase in gross usable reserves to over $40 billion, a greatly improved
term structure of external debt with short-term debt reduced to $32.5 billion (compared with
$63.2 billion at the end of 1997 and $93.0 billion at the end of 1996), and an inflation rate around
4 percent. Interest rates were reduced such that the overnight call rate was 8.5 percent and the
three-year corporate bond yield was 12.5 percent leading up to SAL II effectiveness.
18. On the down side, GDP is estimated to have contracted by 5.8 percent in 1998 and
unemployment to have risen to 7.9 (end of year) percent compared with 3 percent before the
crisis. The decline was worse than originally expected. The three major components of
domestic demand fell, first an investment decline, then a drop in private consumption, which, in
turn, was made worse by an initially contractionary fiscal policy. Corporate sector distress was
exacerbated by interest rate spikes, and the regional contagion that reduced the potential for
export-led recovery (half of Korea's exports were within Asia) drove Korea further into
recession.. Most of the "first line of defense" resources had also been disbursed.
19. The most significant short-term achievement was to reverse several key negative trends
and reduce the threat of default: the rising current account surplus, increasing usable reserves,
increasing rollover ratio for external debt, and reduced interest rates. The ground was laid for
economic recovery.
Structural Reforms
20. The Government made significant progress on all major fronts associated with SAL I,
with most policy actions completed prior to Board presentation. Prior actions are summarized in
Annex B. The following summarizes prior actions and actions taken after SAL I effectiveness
and leading up to SAL II.
Macroeconomic
21. The macroeconomic framework was agreed with the IMF, which oversaw benchmarks in
this area. Improvements in the macroeconomy are summarized above.
Financial
22. Under SAL I, the insolvency of the financial system dictated that GOK first deal with
troubled institutions. GOK, working in close collaboration with the Bank, developed a plan to
resolve distressed banks as required, with shareholders suffering substantial dilution and top
managers losing their jobs, while minimizing disruption to the flow of credit to the economy. In
addition to the immediate term liquidations and recapitalizations, the Bank, under SAL I pursued
longer term measures in supervision and regulation.
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23. Commercial Bank Rehabilitation. The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was
assigned responsibility for dealing with financial distress. GOK provided support to commercial
banks via the purchase of non-performing loans by KAMCO and capital injections.
24. Two major distressed commercial banks (Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank) were
nationalized and preparations begun for sale to international financial institutions. After GOK
assumed control of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank and wrote down existing shareholders'
stake in the two banks to less than 10 percent of their original stake and injected new capital,
investment banks were invited (early 1998) to develop a privatization strategy for these two
banks. The government hired an international investment bank to sell both Korea First and Seoul
Banks. They also contracted with an international auditing firm to prepare books and records to
facilitate due diligence by potential purchasers.
25. Twelve commercial banks that failed to meet capital adequacy requirements at year-end
1997 were required to submit rehabilitation plans to government. At the end of June, following
diagnostic audits, five banks' plans were rejected, and they were closed with their assets and
liabilities transferred to stronger banks. The remaining seven banks' plans were conditionally
approved and they were given one month to submit restructuring proposals (Implementation
Plans). Among these seven were the four largest private banks in Korea. In the end, two of the
four large banks (Commercial and Hanil) merged and were nationalized by government.
Negotiations with the other two large banks (Korea Exchange and Cho Hung) continued beyond
the SAL I period. During SAL I one of the three small banks was acquired by a stronger
institution, and the two others were subject to close supervision. Diagnostic reviews on the
remaining banks (those that met the year-end 1997 capital requirement) were completed during
the SAL I period, and none of these were subject to intervention.
26. Support was provided to banks through purchases of NPLs by KAMCO at prices
arguably equivalent to market value (though in practice probably somewhat higher), and through
capital injections by the new Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), which consolidated
the various deposit insurance entities. Capital injections were made only to support acquisition
of failed banks by healthier banks, or as part of nationalization. Support was provided in a
transparent manner.
27. Merchant Banks. The majority of the distressed merchant banks were closed. GOK
called for rehabilitation plans of all merchant banks and revoked the licenses and ordered the
closure of 10 merchant banks in early February (12 by March 1998, eventually 16). Depositors
were paid out and assets of the closed banks were disposed. The 14 merchant banks that
remained open were subject to closer supervision. Some progress was made in resolving other
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) during the SAL I period.
28. Regulatory Framework. Progress was made in improving the regulatory framework as
some prudential regulations were strengthened (i.e. loan classification and provisioning, foreign
exchange positions). Disclosure standards were improved. The government's ability to impose
enforcement orders on banks was enhanced. But a substantial work agenda remained for SAL II.
29. Supervision. Leading up to SAL I, GOK consolidated four supervisory agencies into the
FSS. The FSC became operational on April 1, 1998. This supervisory structure covered banks,
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NBFIs and capital markets in one body under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister's
Office Diagnostic reviews were programmed to monitor loan loss provisioning. Steps were
initiated toward strengthening institutional capacity for supervision. A major institution-a
development program, supported by international consultants, was planned for launch in the first
quarter of 1999.
30. Developing Capital Markets. GOK liberalized capital market investment as the
government eliminated the restriction (4 percent) on foreign bank ownership of commercial and
merchant banks. The Government also liberalized capital markets by opening to foreign
investors the domestic bond market and money market instruments issued by non-financial
institutions. GOK removed the aggregate limit on foreign investment in equities of listed firms
and eliminated restrictions on corporate foreign borrowing. Several public-private sector task
forces were formed to build a consensus on a plan for further liberalization and strengthening of
market infrastructure, but little progress in actual implementation was made after SAL I
disbursement. However, SAL II followed-up in these areas.
Corporate Sector
31. SAL I continued progress in the areas of governance with more specific reforms of the
roles of boards of directors, the insolvency framework, and financial transparency and
accountability. There were early gains in financial disclosure which paved the way for corporate
reform and helped restore some confidence by the external market. Further improvement in
financial disclosure and transparency lagged in the middle part of 1998, but gained momentum
leading up to SAL II. Achievement of objectives was reasonably good with respect to
governance and the competition framework, but also lagged in mid- 1998
Governance
32. Strengthened role of directors of companies. SAL I sought to remedy several
weaknesses in boards of directors of large Korean companies, in particular, their diffuse
responsibilities and subordination to large shareholders. SAL I strengthened their function by
including at least one outside director on the board. Once GOK agreed with this principle, it then
exceeded the target under SAL I by mandating that at least 25 percent of boards be comprised of
outside directors.
33. Strengthening of minority shareholders' rights. The Securities Exchange Act
strengthened minority shareholders' rights by lowering the threshold for exercising rights, for
example to file a shareholders' representative suit from 1 to 0.05 percent of outstanding shares
(and later reduced to 0.01 percent), and for inspection rights from 3 to 1 percent. For listed
companies, the threshold for making proposals at a shareholders' meeting was reduced to 0.5
percent. For unlisted companies the threshold was reduced from 5 percent to 3 percent.
Thresholds for inspecting company records and calling shareholders' meetings were further
reduced.
34. Improving the insolvency system. SAL I made several advances in dealing with
bankruptcies and fortifying creditors' rights. Previous to the crisis, bankruptcies were virtually
non-existent in Korea (less than 100 annually, including personal bankruptcies) and there was no
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clearing system to deal with the new spate of bankruptcies. An exit system was needed for
creditors and non-viable enterprises. With SAL I support, Korea pursued voluntary workouts
that were backed by a credible threat of bankruptcy litigation under specified time limits. Thei
new bankruptcy laws empowered courts to freeze assets within two weeks of a filing for the
purpose of providing fair treatment for creditors. Courts could also impose a one year limit on
reorganizations. Voluntary workouts served as a good complement to the court system and
reduced the need for litigation. In adjudication, judges were forbidden to consider non-financial
arguments in their rulings. For example, adverse social consequences, such as job loss, could not
be considered. Specific key measures taken to improve the insolvency system included:
* Bankruptcy Act gave district courts authority over involuntary bankruptcy and
composition and reorganization procedures that were formerly divided
* Reorganization Act: expedited the process by setting deadlines, promoting courts'
expertise by creating an administrative body, and enhancing creditors' role by creating a
creditors' committee.
* The Composition Act strengthened the implementation process by introducing an
administrator of asset preservation, imposing on debtors the obligation to report on
implementation, and requiring evaluation of debtors' implementation by creditors.
35. Improving financial reporting and disclosure. Korea's accounting practices had
lagged far behind its economic development. Although ERL supported some improvements, the
accounting and auditing profession still needed fundamental reform to achieve financial
transparency and reliability. While the profession was highly regulated, the quality of financial
reporting and audit was poor and confidence in financial statements was low. The regulatory
framework, incentive structure, and culture of minimum disclosure helped create an environment
in which accountants and auditors were neither prepared nor held accountable for preparing
reliable information, providing assurance, or helping identify weaknesses. Maximum audit fees
were set by the Government. The application and enforcement of standards was poor. The
Bank supported three areas to upgrade financial reporting: upgrading standards; rationalizing the
institutional framework for setting standards, including enhancing the role of the Korean Institute
of Chartered Public Accountants (KICPA); and improving the financial oversight role of boards
of directors, including the internal audit function and selection of external auditors. Important
specific measures included:
* Commitment to establish an independent accounting standards setting body and strengthen
KICPA's role in issuing auditing standards, monitoring professional quality, and enforcing a
code of conduct.
* Commitment to preparation and audit of financial statements of listed companies, banks, and
other financial institutions in accordance with accounting and auditing standards that are
consistent with international best practices starting in the year 1999.
* Issuance of implementing rules for consolidated financial statements for majority owned
companies and combined financial statements for all major commonly controlled companies
starting in 1999 (originally slated for the year 2000).
* Completion of the study on introducing audit committees of boards of directors with the goal
of upgrading the audit selection committee to an independent and transparent audit
committee of boards of directors.
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The External Audit of Joint Stock Corporations Act which accelerated the introduction of
consolidated financial statements for corporate groups from the year 2000 to 1999, and
required an audit selection committee for listed companies and affiliates of large business
groups.
36. Overall accomplishments were somewhat less than what was sought by the Bank. The
Bank encouraged GOK to establish a subcommittee of boards of directors to oversee the financial
reporting process and internal control structure of listed companies and act as a liaison with external
auditors. The GOK had initiated a reform by requiring the establishment of an audit selection
committee that was not sufficiently independent and had responsibility only for the selection of external
auditors rather than the full responsibility that should be vested with an audit committee of the boards
of directors. This committee represented creditors and the largest shareholders. This arrangement was
not consistent with intemational best practices. There was reluctance initially to adopting intemational
standards. Overall, progress in reducing the role of the Government in setting standards and regulating
the accounting and auditing profession was slow.
Competition Policy
37. The record here has been mixed. Significant prior actions were taken, but partially
undermined later by the quality of implementation. For instance, GOK announced that business
combinations which substantially reduce competition were no longer permitted. However, it is
not clear whether the KFTC has been able to enforce adequately the new, pro-competition
regulations. Performance on competition policy lagged after SAL I effectiveness and before
fulfillment of SAL H prior conditions. Major prior conditions included:
* Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act: permits takeovers of non-
strategic companies by foreign investors without government approval, and raises the
foreign stock ownership ceiling without approval by the Board of Directors from 10
percent to 33 percent.
* Corporation Tax Act: advances removal of the tax exemption regarding interest costs of
excessive borrowings as losses and expenses from year 2002 to 2000.
* Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Act: provides tax breaks for restructuring of
firms, including exemption of SMEs from capital gains tax on sale of real estate used to
repay debt to financial institutions, and on transfers of real estate through M&A.
* Antitrust and Fair Trade Act: prohibits any new cross debt guarantees and eliminates all
existing cross debt guarantees by the end of March, 2000.
38. Measures to strengthen the KFTC were announced, but not fully carried out. Completion
of the review of the FTA was delayed, which delayed implementation of FTA amendments
recommended by the Joint Public/Private Sector Committee. The FTA did gain some authority
and was empowered to eliminate private restrictions to entry and exit, such as the requirement of
trade association membership. The requirement that asset sales must be held publicly, not secretly
or through swaps among the chaebols, was also instituted. A web page was developed to
improve transparency of KFTC operations. Hostile takeovers were also allowed.
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39. The Joint Committee performed well, going beyond its requirement to the point of
drafting a law against collusion and price fixing on government contracts. The Joint Committee
also specified the level of fines and penalties for violations. The ceiling on foreign investment in
listed stocks was eliminated ahead of schedule. Foreign ownership of listed Korean companies
may now reach 100 percent. In accordance with SAL I reforms, GOK developed comprehensive
merger and acquisition guidelines for all sectors, and for inter-firm collaborative agreements.
Labor Markets/Social Safety Nets
40. SAL I substantially broadened the ERL program, laying out specific measures in three
areas: the labor market, anti-poverty and pensions.
41. Labor market flexibility and functioning. Beyond the major change of lifting a
suspension on worker dismissals under the Labor Standards Act of February 1997, SAL I made
improvements in unemployment insurance and employment services. One of the key measures
was to expand unemployment compensation (and coverage under the Labor Standards Act in
general) to firms with five or more workers. (Previously, only firms employing more than thirty
workers were covered). GOK conducted a review of employment services, although it was not
particularly good quality. GOK also removed at least one serious impediment to private provision
ofjob placement services (approval of the Ministry of Labor). Specific measures to increase labor
market flexibility were:
X The Labor Standards Act which allows firms to make layoffs under M&As and to avoid
financial difficulties.
* The Act relating to Protection for Dispatched Workers which introduces manpower
leasing services for selected jobs requiring professional knowledge, skills and experience
(a Presidential Decree later limited the application of manpower leasing to 26 occupations,
however).
42. Poverty and support to the unemployed. Because the crisis was still fresh, Koreans
were still in shock. They had not accepted the concept of a sustained increase in poverty. The
common belief was that the poverty was very transitory, with any increase disappearing by the
end of 1998. On the contrary, poverty was rising rapidly, engulfing a large share of the
population, and would take much longer to alleviate. To know which safety net measures were
needed and what they would cost, Koreans had to have a better understanding of the dimensions
of poverty. SAL I helped establish a national poverty line, and develop a multipurpose household
survey data set in 1998. As a result of the new focus on measurement, GOK discovered that,
from the beginning of the crisis until the last quarter of 1998, poverty in Korea, based on the
Urban Family Income and Expenditure Survey, had increased from 9 to 15 percent. To reduce
the impact, the GOK committed to at least maintaining constant real per beneficiary public
expenditures on targeted poverty programs, and made adequate budget allocations. Additional
measures included:
. The Basic Employment Policy Act authorizing the Ministry of Labor to implement
unemployment measures, including vocational training to promote employment and
financial support to cover living costs and medical care costs for the unemployed.
* The Employment Insurance Act reducing minimum contribution period from 12 to 6
months temporarily until June 30, 1999; and increasing the minimum duration of benefit
period to 60 days and minimum amount of Job Search Allowance from 50 to 70 percent of
minimum wage.
* The Wage Claim Guarantee Act entitling those laid off at bankrupt firms with more than
five workers to a sum equal to three months' pay plus three years' severance pay from a
state-managed compensation fund, financed by employers' contribution, from July 1,
1998.
43. Pensions. SAL I pursued both short and long-run objectives for the pension system, as
well as social and financial. The short-run plan was to ensure adequate protection for those hurt
by the crisis. The long-run plan was to ensure fiscal soundness of the pension system well into the
next century. Korea did not have a fully functional national pension plan at the time of the crisis.
In 1988, GOK inaugurated the National Pension Scheme (NPS), but the NPS was not going to
pay out full old-age benefits until 2008. As an interim measure, one of SAL I's major initiatives
was to ensure protection for the elderly poor through a means-tested, non-contributory social
pension for the elderly. Initially (1998), this "Compensation Fund," was funded by budgetary
allocation, which subsequently would receive contributions from employers equivalent to 2 to 3
percent of the wage bill. In addition, the NPS was extended to urban self-employed workers and
to workers in establishments with fewer than 5 employees.
44. To improve the fiscal status of pensions, under SAL I, the GOK had to simultaneously
pursue certain financial reforms. GOK agreed to phase out forced government borrowing and
directed credits from pension fund reserves. Several measures were instituted to pave the way for
investing the pension fund in other assets, and enhancing professionalism in pension fund
management. These measures had the dual objectives of raising returns on Korea's pension
reserves, while also helping to develop the capital market. One important step identified was to
move toward a secondary market for the government securities that the NPS might hold. This
measure would give a more reliable value to pension assets. Private insurance schemes were also
examined as a vehicle to broaden the reach of pensions in the longer term. To win support for
fiscal measures required for actuarial fitness of the pension system, SAL I also supported a public
information campaign.
45. In summary, most of the objectives of SAL I were accomplished by the closing date, with
most of the policy actions implemented prior to SAL I Board presentation. SAL I should be
viewed as part of a broader, longer-term series of efforts to stabilize the Korean economy and
return it to a path of sustainable growth. SAL I was the second loan in a series of planned
adjustment loans dealing with major aspects of the crisis. SAL I implementation supported
preparation of the third loan, the second structural adjustment operation (SAL II, loan amount -
$2 billion in two tranches, effective October 23, 1998), which deepened the SAL I reform
measures and was to be implemented over a longer period. Preparation of a fourth loan is
dependent on Korea's needs after implementation of SAL II.
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C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project
46. SAL I was part of a continuous operation, following ERL by only three months. Like ERL;
lending was prepared and negotiated by the Bank on an accelerated basis, though not as rapid as for
ERL, during January and February, 1998. SAL I was declared effective on March 27, 1998 and
the entire $2 billion was disbursed on the same day. SAL I closed on August 31, 1998.
47. Because SAL I followed so soon after ERL, the Bank did not have much additional time
to design SAL I based on a detailed body of data and analysis. The learning curve was still
steep. Nevertheless, SAL I effectively built on the broad structural framework outlined in the
ERL and developed detailed and specific conditionality, while also broadening the reform
agenda. There was also substantial continuity in the Bank team that had prepared ERL which
had expertise on Korea and on countries experiencing financial distress, particularly with the
Asian Crisis.
48. The rationale for the Bank following up quickly after ERL was the still urgent need for
balance of payments (BOP) assistance. The GOK and the Bank were in agreement on most of the
reform agenda, but because of the time constraint, some elements of the agenda were rushed.
Under a compressed timetable, measures such as reducing industry concentration to promote
competition and establishing viable audit committees of boards of directors, did not have time to
season and eam full GOK ownership. Without stronger reforms in both internal and external
audits, Korea risked not having the necessary audit function in place to send signals of trouble in
advance.
49. Although there was a strong continuity from ERL, SAL I, as its name would suggest, was
designed as a more typical structural adjustrnent operation. There was no issue of precedent or
" special circumstances" as there was for ERL. Like ERL, SAL I was also made to a country where
no Bank economic and sector work nor country assistance strategy had been done for some years,
but with SAL I there was a more typical set of conditions. The Bank overcame the disadvantage of
the lack of economic and sector work, as mentioned, by maintaining continuity of expertise from
ERL. Staff experienced in Korea and in countries in financial distress had been assembled and
could assess conditions in Korea. The Bank continued to exploit expertise in Korea, as well,
mostly at universities, think tanks and non-governmental organizations.
50. Factors not generally subject to Government's control. Korea continued to suffer from
the spread of the Asian crisis in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Investor confidence in the
region was already severely shaken. G-7 countries still faced domestic resistance to another bailout
and lobbied the Bank (and the IMF) to continue frontloading, to ease the pressure to tap G-7 funds.
51. Because it was such a large operation, G-7 influence was needed beyond that of the
combined power of the IMF and the Bank. The short-term debt restructuring, which was critical
to Korea avoiding default, would have been difficult without the pressure of the G-7 on their
banks.
52. The victory by the opposition government was an advantage to the reform program. The
opposition won on a platform of change and reform, notwithstanding some of the rhetoric of the
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campaign. The new government was receptive, for example, to pro-competition policies, a
culture not well-developed in the Korean economy.
53. Factors generally subject to Government control. The GOK was vulnerable to a
complacent attitude once the extreme pressure of massive default had lifted. There grew a lack
of willingness to make a clean break with the incentive regime based on a strong element of
moral hazard. This incentive regime rewarded conglomerates when economic times were good,
but punished the financial sector when times were bad. The complacency may also have been
supported by the fact that for several decades, it had been a low inflation, low unemployment,
high growth, budget surplus, low public debt country, which contributed to the belief that the
crisis was temporary and not requiring deep structural reform.
54. Other measures within the Government's control were laid out in the Letter of
Development Policy for SAL I. The substantial progress made with respect to those factors is
detailed in Section B. The prior government also allowed Bank staff to brief opposition leaders
during the election campaign and the transition period, which helped the new government
develop ownership of the reforms. The relatively advanced store of expertise on the Korean
economy outside the government also continued to benefit the reform process.
55. Factors generally subject to implementing agency control. The BOK's and MOFE's
responses were good. The teams from both agencies worked well with Bank and IMF staff
during a still difficult period. MOFE played a key role in coordinating reforms that cut across
government agencies.
D. Project Sustainability
56. SAL I was part of a continuous reform program during which Korea made substantial
progress in structural reforms and other measures. Korea's advantage in extricating itself from
the economic crisis is its long record of high growth and its well developed economy. The
disadvantage is that Korea has dug a fairly deep hole, especially with respect to corporate debt.
Sustained reform offers the quickest exit from the crisis. Thus, one disconcerting element to the
trends in reform progress was the ebb and flow in the rate of reform that coincided closely with
the proximity of funds release. If no more SALs (or other reforn-based assistance) follow, there
is the risk that the Bank would lose its leverage. The Koreans might halt the reforms, for
example, before the chaebols are fundamentally reformed. There has also been some slippage in
enforcement of newly strengthened laws, as in the case of pro-competition laws. However, with
the present leadership's demonstrated commitment to significant reform in the past year, there is
a strong indication that Korea will continue reforms until fundamental restructuring is complete.
57. The strongest incentive for the continuation of a successful reform program is the desire
not to relive the near collapse of the economy and not to prolong the already sharp increase in
unemployment. In this regard, the Bank, through TA and supervision, must continue to help the
Koreans make the connection between the reforms and sustained, long-run economic
improvement. One example is that the high risk premium embedded in the interest rate that the
corporate sector faces could be lowered if corporate restructuring progresses. The underlying
strength of the reforms is that they are linked to the root causes of the crisis. Therefore, they
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offer Korea the best path to strong and sustained growth in the context of today's more integrated
and competitive global economy.
58. Another reassurance that the reforms are sustainable is that some of them, such as the
disposition of some large companies and banks, are very difficult to reverse and will likely lead
to further asset sales. Measures to increase transparency, although progressing slowly, have set a
process in motion that will develop a warning system for future financial problems before they
get to the crisis stage. Still, although the framework for improved financial and corporate
transparency and competition has been enacted, the real test will come in their practical
implementation.
59. Despite a stop and go reform rhythm that closely tracked tranche releases rather closely,
overall progress in implementing the objectives of SAL I was satisfactory. Subsequent
operations (see section H.), if implemented, would support a continued process of stabilization
and structural reform that emphasize deeper financial and corporate sector reforms and further
mitigation of the social side affects of adjustment.
E. Bank Performance
60. With SAL I, the Bank sought to maintain momentum of the ERL, both in terms of
structural reforms and economic stabilization and worked to help the GOK steer through the
crisis. Below is a review of Bank performance from the standpoints of what was a reasonable
course of action at the time and what would have been the best course in retrospect. Some of the
elements of Bank performance cited under ERL (see ICR for the ERL), held for SAL I, but are
not repeated here.
- The Bank/GOK reform program achieved substantial progress in most, if not all, areas
through the Board conditions for SAL I
After the ERL helped navigate through the initial shock, SAL I deepened reforms in the
financial, corporate and social sectors. Although financial institutions were still being
resolved, SAL I moved to longer term reforms in the areas of supervision and regulation.
Efforts in the corporate area resulted in strengthening shareholders' rights and the role of
the Boards of Directors. Competition policies were agreed upon in principle and enacted,
as were key financial and corporate transparency measures, with implementation to be
developed over subsequent adjustment operations. First steps were also taken with
respect to setting up the pension system and other safety net components in a coherent
and sustainable way. With the institution of layoffs, the labor market began to function
more flexibly.
* The Bank rapidly pursued a follow-up operation to ERL
Preparation of SAL I began almost immediately after disbursement of ERL with a target
of late February for effectiveness. This rapid follow-up was a response to the fact that
while the external situation had improved, the potential for default was still real well into
January, 1998. By mid-February, conditions had improved to the point that GOK was
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willing to risk some delay in effectiveness in order to negotiate more attractive loan
pricing. This was an indication that Korea's situation had significantly improved since
the negotiation of ERL.
* Some elements of the reform program were watered down in order to achieve a quick
liquidity transfer.
In addition to not obtaining the audit committee of boards of directors, the Bank, with
time running out and without strong support from the IMF, could not get the GOK
commitment to use top level external auditors from international financial centers. Thus,
there was some sacrifice of quality and independence which was essential to corporate
reform. In the end, there was a clear trade-off between maintaining momentum for
stabilization, and maintaining leverage for the longer term program.
* The Bank did not explicitly state the higher than standard SAL pricing until the negotiation
stage.
The higher pricing surprised Koreans, who had expected standard terms, and delayed
effectiveness (see section B.) Protracted discussion of the pricing issue ensued, in which
the Koreans negotiated for better terms and demonstrated that they were willing to live
with delayed effectiveness for one month, and, perhaps, did not consider the SAL I BOP
assistance as urgent a need as in the few weeks following ERL.
* The IMF took the lead role in overall reform agenda
The Bank had by this time substantial a experience in designing a reform agenda for
countries in distress. The Bank did assert its views in some instances, most notably, the
preference for a fiscal stance that was more stimulative and supported larger safety nets.
Still, the Bank was reluctant in some cases to take a hard line stance that differed from the
IMF's. Although the Bank's reconstruction/adjustment operation was the largest in its
history, it was implicit that the much larger IMF program entitled it to take a broad
overall lead in the recovery program. The Bank did, however, maintain leadership in the
corporate and social sectors.
* The Bank and the Fund communicated well, but had different approaches to policy matrices.
There was daily communication between the IMF and the Bank. The two institutions'
policy matrices overlapped and were largely consistent. The IMF tended to include
large portions of the Bank's areas of responsibility, e.g., corporate governance and
restructuring, in its own policy matrix, while the Bank policy matrix opted for a very
brief summary of the Fund's macro program. For example, to capture the
macroeconomic policy domain largely under the IMF, the Bank's policy matrix
referred to "Sound management of macroeconomic policies.. .within an agreed
macroeconomic framework." The IMF's practice of including more detailed sections
in areas led by the Bank (e.g., corporate sector governance and restructuring and social
safety nets) was helpful when the IMF's position was fully consistent with the Bank's,
but weakened the Bank's position when it was not. An example of inconsistency was
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the IMF's acceptance, and inclusion in its Letter of Intent (LOI), of GOK's use of an
audit selection committee rather than an independent audit committee of the boards,
which the Bank considered inadequate.
The Bank approved a relatively large TA loan ($48 million) to help institute new, more
transparent practices supported by the SAL I program.
The need for assistance in new accounting practices, auditing, financial workouts, etc.,
was vast. This TA emphasized assistance for corporate restructuring ($32 million or two-
thirds of the loan). In policy areas where Korean commitment to reform was weaker, the
Bank found it more difficult to assist the relevant agencies with sufficient TA. The Bank
delivered financial sector assistance through the country unit and through SFO. In the
areas of accounting reform and competition policies, TA was a very small share of total
TA (about 2 percent combined). The Korean Asset Management Corporation also did not
receive adequate TA to carry out its asset sales.
61. In summary, although the Bank experienced obstacles in bringing SAL I to effectiveness,
it succeeded in substantially advancing the reform program and in rapidly providing balance of
payments assistance. On a compressed timetable, the Bank, with other donors and the GOK,
specified conditions to address major areas of stabilization and structural reform. The Bank also
effectively supported the IMF efforts by stressing the importance of an effective macro-economic
stabilization plan and a medium-term structural reform framework as essential conditions for
Board presentation of SAL I, and by closely monitoring the measures in the policy matrix.
F. Borrower Performance
62. As measured by its fulfillment of pre-Board measures and continued commitment to a
reform framework, Government performance is considered satisfactory. The Government's
policy commitments laid out in its Letter of Development Policy were largely accomplished.
The GOK committed to a heavy legislative agenda and held special sessions of the National
Assembly. The transition team worked well and with a minimum of infighting between the
incoming and outgoing governments, and was efficiently coordinated. There was also continuity
of counterparts at MOFE from ERL through SAL I, which facilitated the policy forrnulation.
The newly elected government supported the program during SAL I effectiveness and leading up
to SAL II. The GOK, at times, placed very ambitious goals on the reform program. For
instance, the Korean President had wanted financial sector restructuring completed by September
30, 1998. However, an overhaul of economic practices that had been pursued since the early
1960s could not be effected in a single year, and is expected to take much longer. In some cases,
such as in accounting and auditing reform, empowering the KIPCA, and some competition
policies, individual agencies were able to resist or slow major changes and the building up of
capacity through infusions of TA.
63. BOK, on behalf of the Government, maintained the accounts for the SAL I. It was agreed
that the accounts would be audited and a report prepared within four months if requested by the
Bank. Government compliance with legal covenants under SAL I was considered satisfactory.
- 17-
G. Assessment of Outcome
64. The overall performance and outcome of SAL I was satisfactory. A medium-terfmi
framework for structural reform in financial, corporate and social sectors was established, within
which GOK implemented significant reform measures. SAL I was also successful as part of the
total rescue package, because Korea continued its move away from the precipice of default. This
rating is consistent with the rating by EASPR of meeting development objectives (Form 590) at
project close (also Satisfactory). Because it was not an investment operation, calculation of
benefits in terms of net present value and economic rates of return is not applicable.
H. Future Operations
65. The second Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL II) was the immediate follow-up operation,
effective October 23, 1998. SAL II ($2 billion) was a two tranche loan to support Government
efforts to deepen structural reform in the financial sector and the corporate sector and further
strengthen social safety nets.
I. Key Lessons Learned
66. Because SAL I built on the ERL, many of the lessons learned under ERL apply to SAL I
as well. These lessons learned are only briefly summarized here (see ICR for ERL for more
detail). Lessons learned specific to SAL I follow.
Summary of Lessons Learned from ERL and Underscored by SAL I
67. Maintaining a current knowledge base on countries even when countries graduate can
make it much easier to come to a country's assistance. The Bank still had a steep learning curve
for preparation of SAL I. The Bank continued to exploit non-governmental expertise to help
close the knowledge gap. The Bank continued to use the tripartite forum of major
stakeholders as an effective vehicle to achieve consensus on the more painful reforms.
68. Under SAL I and leading up to SAL II, the Bank learned the importance of maximizing
negotiating results during brief windows of opportunity when crises are most acute and
when countries are most inclined to commit to reforms. Negotiations were much more difficult
under the two operations following ERL. Still, the Bank maintained a streamlined approach to
loan preparation in a pressing situation that allowed a quick follow-up of $2 billion in BOP
assistance. At the same time, the Bank should ensure that program design and loan terms are
discussed together from the beginning. A borrower must know the terms of the loan as it is
being designed, especially if the terms are non-standard.
Other Lessons Learned from SAL I
* The costs of preparing a loan on a highly compressed timetable. The scarcity of time for
loan preparation can lead to oversights that lead to a net delay in the final analysis. Under
SAL I, the Bank intended to charge a higher than standard price for SAL I. While there were
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reasons for the Koreans to expect a higher price, there was no explicit indication that the
Bank wanted to do so. As a result, the Koreans' had a basis to balk at the agreement which
led to nearly a one month delay in effectiveness. That delay was inefficient because that tinie
could have been better employed on the substance of the SAL I program rather than
bargaining over the price of the loan. As a result of the further negotiations, the Koreans
managed to save a further 25 basis points. A more important cost was the lack of time to
achieve government ownership on more contentious reform elements such as the audit
reforms.
* Beginning policy discussions with the top policy makers. It is advisable to initiate
adjustment negotiations with senior policy makers who are actually in a position to decide
on, or to know about feasible reform commitments. Under SAL I, a fair amount of time was
lost in early discussions with technical people who were not in a position to advance policy
discussions with the Bank team.
* The Bank and the Fund and a unified front. The negotiating positions of both the Bank
and the IMF are weakened when their positions are not fully consistent. Borrowing countries
can easily detect inconsistencies, especially in the midst of simultaneous negotiations in the
same policy areas, and can play one institution against the other. One example was the
external audit reforms where the Bank, under time pressure, accepted a less than full
commitment. Another was where Korean Banks wanted to defer losses so that they could
more easily meet capital adequacy which was not consistent with best practices. GOK
prevailed on the IMF to allow this, but the Bank held very firm and the IMF relented.
* Single vs. double tranche approach. A single tranche policy-based operation (such as SAL
I), with the framework for policy actions clearly laid out and a substantial part of it
implemented prior to Board approval, is an effective way to quickly transfer liquidity in urgent
situations. The single tranche instrument is best used when the economic situation is volatile,
as in SAL I, where the longer term rigidity of second tranche conditions could be
disadvantageous. However, single tranche operations offer only a 2 to 3 month window to
accomplish reforms. After disbursement, reforms, as in SAL I, may well lag until the next
operation's prospect of fund release. Two tranche operations offer a longer period to enact
reforms and carry the stronger incentive of tranche release conditions, as opposed to
"monitorable indicators." Administratively, it is cheaper to have one two tranche rather than
two single tranche operations.
* One to one on site guidance through reforms. Slippage in reforms may occur due to a
borrower's unfamiliarity with the economics behind the reforms, as in the case of the risk of
concentrating industry further through "Big Deals". A seminar on competitive policies is a
good way to have government ownership of an increasing competition culture. TA projects
may be too slow in matching infusions of technical guidance with actual implementation in a
timely way. Assessment of upfront loan fees argues for abundant upfront provision of this type
of assistance.
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Table 1: Summary of Assessments
A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negigible Not applicable
(M) -(7) - (V)
Macro Policies Ix E [1 C1
Sector Policies El E3 Cl [1
Financial Objectives E1 El E 
Institutional Development [l x] a] E1
Physical Objectives E [x] El cl
Poverty Reduction El Lx] El al
Gender Issues E1 El E1 IX]
Other Social Objectives El El E l
Environmental Objectives El E1 E [ZI
Public Sector Management El El El [HI
Private Sector Development El [El El El
Other (specify) al El EC1
B. Project Sustainability Unlikey Uncertain
Highly
C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
(/) ~~~~~~(10 (11)
Identification El X E
Preparation Assistance El [23 El
Appraisal E El[
Supervision E x] El
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(Continued)
Highly
D. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Preparation z r1 [
Implementation El jxj [
Covenant Compliance a U cl
Operation (if applicable) C3 C
Highly Highly
E. Assessment of Outcome satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory
(/) () (1/) )
U U EEl
Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits
Loan/credit title Purpose Year of approval Status
Preceding operations
1. Financial Intermediation Provide TA to GOK and FY 94 Closed
Loan BOK to develop a
program of structural
reform in the financial
sector
Following operations
1. Financial and Corporate Strengthen financial FY 99 Under
Restructuring Assistance management, monitoring Implementation
Project and regulatory
framework. Improve
enterprise transparency
and govemance
2. Structural Adjustment Restore financial FY 99 Under
Loan II stability, mitigate social Implementation
costs of adjustment and
support deep structural
reforms in the corporate
and financial sectors.
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Table 3: Project Timetable
Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Date Actual!
Latest Estimate
Identification (Executive Project Summary)
Preparation 1/98
Appraisal 2/98
Negotiations 2/98 2-3/98
Letter of Development/Sector Policy (if applicable) 2/98-
Board Presentation 2/98 3/98
Signing 2/26/98 3/26/98
Effectiveness 2/26/98 3/27/98
First Tranche Release (if applicable) 2/26/98 3/27/98
Midterm review (if applicable)
Project Completion
Loan Closing 8/31/98
Table 4: Disbursements: Cumulative, Estimated and Actual
(US$ millions)
FY98
Appraisal estimate 2,000
Actual 2,000
Actual as % of estimate 100
Date of final disbursement 3/27/98
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Table 5: Project Implementation
Estimated Actual
L Key implementation indicators in PAD
1. For all indicators, see Annexes B and C
Table 6: Key Indicators for Program Operation
Estimated Actual
I Key operating indicators in PAD
1. For all indicators, see Annexes B and C
Table 7: Studies Included in Program
Study Purpose as defined at Status Impact of study
appraisal/redefined
1. NO STUDIES
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Table 8.A: Program Costs
Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimates
(US$ millions) (US$ millions)
Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
costs costs costs costs
1.Balance of Payments Assistance 2,000 2,000 2000 2,000
Total 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Table 8B: Program Financing
Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimates
(US$ millions) (US$ millions)
Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
costs costs costs costs
IBRD 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Total 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits
NOT APPLICABLE
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Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants
Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Covenant Comments
Agreement Section Type Status Fulfillment Fulfillment
Date Date
Loan 3.02 (b) I C 6/30/94 Audit of Deposit Account Not yet requested by Bank
Covenant ypes: Present Status:
1. = Accounts/audits 8. = Indigenous people C = covenant complied with
2. = Financial performance/revenue generation from 9. = Monitoring, review, and reporting CD = complied with after delay
beneficiaries 10. = Project implementation not covered CP complied with partially
3. = Flow and utilization of project funds by categories 1-9 NC = not complied with
4. = Counterpart funding 1 1. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary
5. = Management aspects of the project or executing or other resource allocation
agency 12. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/
6. = Environmental covenants regulatory/institutional ction
7. = Involuntary resettlement 13. = Other
Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements
Statement number and title Describe and comment on lack of compliance
1. FULL COMPLIANCE
Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs
Planned Revised Actual
Stage of project cycle Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$
Preparation 69.5 215.0 17.6 49.2
Appraisal 4.0 13.6 9.5 19.4
Negotiations 0 0 9.2 14.2
Supervision 40.0 84.6 68.9 231.5
Completion 4 10.3 6.0 17.2 3.0 7.5
Total 117.5 323.5 105.2 314.3
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Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions
Performance Rating2 Types of
Stage of project cycle Month/ No. of Days Specialization' Implem. Developm. Problems3
Year Persons in status objectives
Field
Appraisal through 1/98- 18 210 E,F,L,S,CS S S
Supervision 8/98
Total
1 - Key to Specialized staff skills:
E-Economics, F-Finance, L-Legal,
S-Social Sector, CS-Corporate
sector
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Borrower Contribution to the ICR (Implementation Completion Report)
SAL (Structural Adjustment Loan)
1. Efforts to Overcome Crisis
Since the ERL (Economic Reconstruction Loan) was introduced from the World Bank,
Korea accelerated its efforts to overcome the financial crisis. The first quarter of 1998,
during which SAL was introduced, marked a critical turning point in reversing dangerous
flows. At the onset of the crisis, the very first task of the Korean government was to secure
the supply of foreign liquidity to stabilize the situation. At the same time, recognizing the
deeper structural origin of the crisis, the Korean government embarked on establishing the
legal and institutional framework for wide ranging structural reforms.
2. Korea's Recovery Process
Through intense negotiations with international financial institutions and creditor nations, the
Korean government was able to secure financial assistance totaling US$21.4 billion from the
IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank by March 1998. It also succeeded
in extending the maturities of eligible short-term debts of the banking sector totaling
US$21.8 billion in March 1998, and in issuing sovereign bonds worth US$4 billion in April
1998. In addition, the nation-wide movement of "gather-gold-for-export-and-repayment-of-
national-debt" raised a total of US$2.1 billion in the first quarter of 1998. Such grass-root
sacrifice and dedication to national cause left the international audience with special
impression of the Korean people and contributed to restoring the international confidence in
Korea. Thanks to such endeavors, Korea succeeded in amassing the usable foreign exchange
reserves to US$30.8 billion by the end of April from the near-depletion level of US$3.9
billion in mid-December 1997.
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3. Charging Ahead with Reforms
From the onset of the crisis, the Korean government under the leadership of President Kim
Dae-jung understood the root causes of the crisis and set out to restructure entire sectors of
the economy. The US$2 billion SAL was the second in a sequence of adjustment borrowings
from the World Bank, and its reform programs were quite compatible with the new
government's policy directions. Recognizing that moral hazard problem of lending and
borrowing practices were at the core of the structural failure, the new government put
heaviest emphasis on restructuring the financial and corporate sectors simultaneously. In
addition, labor and public sector restructuring has also been pursued to give each sector the
flexibility and efficiency necessary to keep up with other sectoral reforms.
4. Key Lessons Learned from the SAL
A few lessons can be obtained from Korea's experience with the SAL. First, the World Bank
and the IMF should work together to better coordinate their positions in negotiating programs
with borrower countries. Discrepancies between the Bank and the IMF regarding the same
issues often cause much confusion for the borrower country. To avoid unnecessary
complications, it is desirable for the Bank and the IMF to delineate their roles and target
areas between themselves. Second, the Bank" inclination for negotiations with senior policy
makers has a weakness which should not be overlooked. Although negotiations with senior
policy makers can expedite the negotiation procedure, leading to an early conclusion of
discussions, the programs may become vulnerable to unexpected problems which can arise
during the implementation process if practical deliberations by technical-level persons are
omitted. Third, the policy programs should be formulated on the basis of good will and
transparency. Ambiguous conditions such as "announce an implementation plan acceptable
to the Bank" endows one side with excessive authority to determine the implementation
status of the condition. Devoid of concrete specification, the borrower country cannot be
sure whether its measures will meet the condition or not. In this sense, it is most desirable to
avoid equivocal terms that can be used as criteria of arbitrary judgment. Finally, the policy
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matrix needs to be made in a prudent manner. For example, during the SAL II negotiation
process, the World Bank's staff raised a slippage matter in implementing SAL I condition
concerning the amendments to the FTA (Fair Trade Act). The dispute between both sides
revolved around the interpretation of the phrase "adopt appropriate legislation". The
confusion may have been prevented if more clear terminology was used such as 'submit' or
'amend' instead of 'adopt' in order to clarify the targeted stage of the legislation.
5. Korean Government's Commitment to Reforms
Confronting serious challenges, Korea bravely bit the bullet and pushed for sweeping
reforms designed to secure the country's recovery into the 21t Century. The rapid
transformation of the Korean economy in such a short period of time has restored the
international community's confidence in the Korean economy. Many analysts believe that
the Korean economy had already bottomed out of the trough in the fourth quarter of 1998.
The Korean economy is headed for a full recovery and the government is committed to
bringing about this result. The Korea's drive for reform is adamant, and no complacency
will weaken it.
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ANNEX B Prior Actions for SAL I
Program of Actions Taken by the Borrower
1. Endow the Special Task Force at the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) (and
its successor later at the Financial Supervisory Commission) with adequate powers to
coordinate the development and implementation of the Borrower's financial sector
recapitalization and restructuring strategy, under mandate set in consultation with the
Bank.
2. Adopt legislation acceptable to the Bank to give supervisory authorities increased
power to intervene and resolve troubled financial institutions.
3. Announce timetable acceptable to Bank for upgrading bank accounting, auditing and
reporting to international standards.
4. Announce a policy of requiring financial institutions to close books and report
publicly on a quarterly basis at the earliest date possible.
5. Notify banking industry of the Borrower's policy of non-intervention in bank
management, including the appointment or approval of directors and managers.
6. For merchant banks, put in place the following to the satisfaction of the Bank:
* issuance of written instructions for due diligence reviews;
* arrangements for internationally recognized firms to conduct rehabilitation
plan evaluations;
* adoption of standardized templates for review of bank rehabilitation plans and
recommendations;
- application of clear standards and instructions for merchant bank evaluations
providing the basis for well-documented decisions on closure or continuation
of operation; and
* establishment of a process to monitor conditionalities placed on merchant
banks allowed to continue to operate, including capital adequacy thresholds.
7. For merchant banks, implement the following actions to the satisfaction of the Bank:
* evaluate the legal basis for bank closure and asset transfer, and take
procedural and legislative steps to address potential legal vulnerabilities;
establish the legal order of creditor repayment;
* clarify bridge bank's role as liquidator, asset manager, and deposit insurance
paying agent;
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* prepare procedures for banking license revocation, bank closure, physical
control, inventory/due diligence, and asset valuation; if external bids for
merger/acquisition are allowed, establish when external bids will be accepted
after license revocation; and
* establish how funds realized from asset sales will be distributed.
8. Require that all commercial banks not meeting BIS capital adequacy standards on
December 31, 1997 provide recapitalization and rehabilitation plans of scope and
detail acceptable to the Bank; same condition to apply to those banks not meeting
these standards on June 30, 1998 and subsequent mandatory reporting dates.
9. Hire internationally recognized firms on terms of reference acceptable to Bank to
assess commercial bank recapitalization and rehabilitation plans.
10. Account for all past support by the Borrower to troubled financial institutions and
corporate enterprises in a transparent manner, recording not only interest costs in the
budget but also the stock of debt incurred by the Borrower and its agencies in the
overall public debt figures; provide a report on these estimates to the Bank.
11. Announce policy that, with effect from the date of the policy announcement. Korea
Asset Management Corporation (KAMC) and other agencies involved in government
support will provide such support only as part of approved
recapitalization/rehabilitation plans or liquidation.
12. Issue written procedures for KAMC and bridge bank operating process, internal
control, transfer pricing, asset valuation, asset sales and bid process (where
applicable) and governance.
13. Establish task force (including private sector experts as well as public authorities) to
study policies to promote primary and secondary debt market.
14. Establish task force to review appropriateness of current capital market configuration.
15. Announce that financial statements of listed companies, banks and other financial
institutions, as well as all joint stock companies with assets in excess of 7 billion won,
will be required to be prepared and audited in accordance with standards consistent
with international best practices and standards beginning with the year 1999.
16. Adopt legislation amending insolvency laws (bankruptcy, composition, and corporate
reorganization) to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, build administrative capacity,
expedite procedures, enhance creditor participation in the reorganization process and
establish economic criteria for the initiation of plans of reorganization.
17. Issue a policy statement announcing the following measures regarding the
restructuring of chaebol, so as to ensure the full application of the Borrower's Fair
Trade Act to increase accountability and transparency and provide equal economic
opportunity:
Annex B Page 3 of 4
* business combinations which substantially reduce competition in a given
market are not permitted;
* entry and/or takeover of divested chaebol operations by new domestic or
foreign firms are to be encouraged;
* information on the reasons and factors considered in permitting/disallowing
business combinations among the chaebol is to be made public; and
* the use of mutual guarantees by affiliates/subsidiaries is to be further reduced.
18. Appoint a joint private/public committee, with terms of reference acceptable to the
Bank. to recommnend amendments to the Borrower's Fair Trade Act and identify
measures which:
* strengthen its market efficiency objectives;
* make its provisions fully and uniformly applicable to all economic sectors,
including the public enterprises;
- increase investigative powers;
* increase sanction powers of Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC); and
- provide appropriate consumer protection from unfair trade practices.
19. Issue a policy statement that the Borrower will take active steps to reduce public and
private barriers to entry and exit of firms and design a regulatory framework to
promote competition among monopolized infrastructure services and utilities, through
such measures as fostering new domestic and/or foreign private sector market
entrants.
20. Develop strategies for institutional development of KFTC to enhance its ability to
implement competition law and policy in accordance with best practice, including a
detailed technical assistance program.
21. Repeal the two-year suspension in effectiveness of Article 31 of the Borrower's
Labor Act and clarify definition of dismissal for managerial reasons.
22. Allow operation of private manpower leasing services.
23. Commit to relax legal restrictions on the private provision of job placement services.
24. Commit to expand coverage of the Borrower's Unemployment Benefits Scheme to
firms with fewer than 5 workers as early as possible.
25. Commit to maintain constant in real terms the level of public expenditure per
beneficiary on major antipoverty programs of the Borrower, including the livelihood
program and the medical aid program.
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26. Commit to expand in real termns Borrower's total budget allocations to antipoverty
programs proportionately with any increase in the prevalence of poverty due to the
current financial crisis.
27. Implement the planned non-contributory and means-tested "social pension" financed
from Borrower's general budget for individuals aged 65 and above.
28. Communicate that the sustainability of the current pension system needs to be
improved and that in an upcoming reform adjustments in the contribution and benefit
structure must take place.
29. Commit to gradually phase out government borrowing from pension fund reserves in
the form of direct credits and to gradually phase in government borrowing from
pension fund reserves in the form of sales of marketable government bonds.
ANNEX C
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ANNEX C: Policy Agreements and Actions as of October 1998
Macroeconomic Framework
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Restoration of financial stability and Sound management of macroeconomic policies-fiscal, Continued adherence to a sound macroeconomic
resumption of sustainable growth. monetary, exchange rate, and external debt and reserve framework.
management policies-conducive to financial stability and an
early recovery of economic activity.
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Financial Sector Reform
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Resolution of Weak Financial
Institutions
Develop financial sector Further develop and clarify strategy, in consultation with the Continue to develop strategy (supported by TA). Issue written
restructuring strategy Bank, including ensuring adequacy of public resources for policies and guidelines consistent with that strategy (ongoing).
use in recapitalizing and restructuring the financial system. In consultation with the Bank, adopt process and principles
necessary to ensure adequate public resources will be made
available by Government in financial system recapitalization
and restructuring.
Resolve 5 undercapitalized FSC to agree specific contract terms with acquiring banks Monitor implementation of contracts and performance
commercial banks and communicate complete contract terms to Bank (August (ongoing).
31). Terms shall include: i) finn agreement on definition of
amount and approach to non-performing assets subject to
put-back taking into consideration non only past due status,
but also qualitative factors affecting loss potential; ii)
provision of enough time for acquiring banks to evaluate
quality of acquired assets; iii) finality of contractual terms
precluding subsequent renegotiation by acquiring banks.
Resolve 7 undercapitalized Banks to submit implementation plans by July 31. Announcement by FSC of its decision on implementation plans
commercial banks FSC to distribute a template for review of implementation by September 30 (decision processes supported by domestic
plans of the four largest conditionally approved banks to aid and international experts, chosen in consultation with the
in evaluating the feasibility of banks' plans. (July 31). Bank).
FSC to contract, under TORs agreed with Bank, with Banks whose implementation plans are not approved to be
international experts to support in-depth analysis of the subject to direct recapitalization, mandatory mergers, transfer
banks' implementation plans and any other submissions by of business under P&A, or exit under PCA procedures.
banks related to the provision of government financial For banks which are subject to direct recapitalization by
support (September 15). government, government will assume the responsibilities of
Adopt objectives and principles, acceptable to the Bank, to ownership, including contracting with experienced senior
be used by Government in making decisions on banks' managers to undertake restructuring, until sale to strategic
implementation plans, including provision of financial investors with sufficient capital and expertise to manage banks.
support by Government (August 31). If a plan is approved, the bank will agree on an MOU with FSC
covering, among others, recapitalization and merger plans,
measures to manage and reduce non-performing assets, and
timetable for achieving performance indicators (including
capital adequacy targets). Dividend payments to be allowed
only when performance indicators are met.
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Objectives ______________________________________________ Policy Measures
r~ ]3First Tranche j Second Tranche
_____________________ 
l ______________________________________________ ____ I 3anks whose approved plans are not, in the event, achieved
|____ _______________ I w~ll he subject to PCA.
Evaluate remaining Initiate diagnostic reviews of remaining commercial banks If a com-mercial bank's capital ratio is found to be below
commercial banks and take (on the basis of June 30 data) by internationally recognized 8% as of end-Jime 1998, FSC will proceed on a similar
appropriate actions accounting firms, signed by domestic and international basis to that described above for 7 banks (September 30). if
partners (August 15). the capital ratio of a bank that had been above 8%
subsequently falls below 8%, FSC will invoke PCA
procedures,
Based on the diagnostic review results, administrative
guidance to strengthen banks' operations will be provided.
Complete privatization of Government to agree with the lead manager selected for FSC/FSB will continue to conduct intensive supervision of
Korea First Bank and Seoul privatization on the general deal structure (including these two banks, including in-depth analysis of
Bank confimation to the Bank of the modalities of provision of management capacity, rehabilitation strategy, and financial
public support), and to authorize lead manager to contact condition (September 30).
investors (September 15). Obtain bids for sale of the banks to strategic investors with
sufficient capital and expertise to manage banks (November
15); achieve progress, satisfactory to the Bank, toward sale.
Evaluate remaining FSC/FSB to strengthen supervision of existing merchant Implement strengthened supervision (ongoing).
merchant banks banks, including conducting on-site examinations to update Banks falling short of minimal capital adequacy
assessment of financial condition, determine capital ratio requirements or in substantial non-compliance with
integrity, and assess compliance with previously approved previously agreed rehabilitation plans, subject to resolution
rehabilitation plans (August 31). process.
Review specialized and Sign contracts for diagnostic reviews, including assessment Complete diagnostic reviews of at least the major
development banks of asset quality, with internationally recognized accounting specialized and development banks (December 15).
frms, as for commercial banks (September).
Use of publicfunds
Government confirms that public funds will be used only:
Adopt sound principles for * in the context of: i) FSC-approved plans developed by Firm adherence to these principles for the use of public
the use of public funds in banks for restructuring and recapitalization, whether as funds (ongoing).
financial system stand-alone entities or via acquisitions or mergers; ii)
restructuring and government takeover of undercapitalized banks; or iii)
recapitalization bank liquidation; with adequate burden sharing,
including contribution of new capital by qualified
investors and/or dilution of ownership interests of
existing shareholders ; where acquisition of equity
positions in government recapitalized banks will be
through a transparent process and open bidding
(exceptions to open bidding must have strong
justification);
ANNEX C Page 4 of 22
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
* where the bank is making adequate progress on
implementation of sound corporate debt restructuring;
and
* in the context of NBFI resolutions, to cover the
difference between explicitly government-guaranteed
liabilities and the market value of assets acquired by
purchasers, or to payoff explicitly government-
guaranteed liabilities in the case of liquidation. Any
additional use of public funds for NBFIs will be limited
to exceptional cases where failure of these institutions
poses a systemic risk. Any such use of public funds
would be made in the context of a comprehensive
restructuring plan for the relevant NBFI sector.
Resolve policy issues Purchases by KAMCO will be at prices that reflect actual Adoption by KAMCO of principles, acceptable to the Bank,
regarding and expected recovery rates as well as the opportunity cost for the disposition of troubled assets acquired by KAMCO,
asset management of the funds employed for collateralized loans, and nominal including the sale of a majority of assets within three years of
prices for unsecured loans (August 31). acquisition. Adoption of procedures, sources and instruments
of funding for KAMCO acceptable to the Bank (December 15).
Strengthen KAMCO's Agree to publish complete semi-annual and annual audited Contract with audit firm, with the first audit to be conducted on
financial fnancial statements (which include results of reviews of June 30, 1999 financial statement (December 15).
reporting and disclosure asset portfolio revaluations) prepared by an audit firm with
international experience in asset revaluation (August 31).
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Strengthen KAMCO's Hire qualified experts to assist in the design and Complete design and agree to implement recommended
infrastructure implementation of the organizational and operational actions (December 15).
structure based on TORs acceptable to the Bank (August Installation of system in process (ongoing).
31). Contract with at least one international asset management
Contract with data management (MIS) firm with proven company to manage and sell assets, according to TORs agreed
track record, according to TORs agreed with the Bank, for with the Bank (October 31), and have the asset management
installation of asset inventory and management company in place (December 15).
information systems (August 31).
Strengthen Supervision and
Regulation
Strengthen independence and Prepare three-year FSB operating budget. Allocate Consistent with the Basle Committee's 25 Core Principles for
authority of supervisory adequate, separate funds for FSB startup costs, and initial Effective Banking Supervision, enhance independence of
agencies operating and extraordinary expenses (including costs of FSC/FSB through ensuring operational independence and
procuring information technology, and TA needs). adequate resources. Issuance and revocation of financial
institutions' licenses to be carried out upon recommendation
of FSC. Review the adequacy and effectiveness of FSC's
governance structure and organization, including the need for
greater representation of members nominated by independent
associations as the current FSC members' terms expire.
Establish the legal framework through which FSB may assess
fees on supervised institutions, with revenues specifically
dedicated to the operations of FSB. Evaluate funding needs
and establish FSB's internal budgetary and funding systems
(December 15).
Complete unification of supervisory organizations. Enhance
consolidated supervision and extend supervisory
arrangements for commercial banks to all NBFIs as
appropriate (December).
Institutionally strengthen FSC Request proposal for contract with internationally Establish management group within FSB and implement
recognized consultant firm, according to TORs agreed enhanced managerial structure (December 15). Implement
with Bank, to implement the strategic blueprint for other major elements of strategic blueprint, including
FSC/FSB institution building, supervisory consolidation, information systems, policies, operational procedures, human
information technology, upgrade of human resources, and resources, and budgetary/administrative functions. Contract
strengthening of supervisory policies and processes signed with internationally recognized consultant firm
(August 31). FSC/FSB to establish and operationalize a (September 30) and major elements implemented (December
special implementation task force fully dedicated to the 15).
tasks of agency consolidation and strengthening of
supervision and human resources. Task force to report to
Chairman of FSC and empowered to access personnel in
each of the 4 supervisory agencies (August 31).
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Enhance supervision With respect to specialized and development banks, On the basis of examinations of specialized and
delegate to FSC powers to examine and to make development banks at the delegation of MOFE, FSC will
recommendations as to consequential remedial actions for make recommendations to MOFE as to any consequential
these institutions (August 31). remedial action required (ongoing).
FSB to strengthen supervisory policies, processes and
procedures for all subject financial institutions, including
on-site supervision, off-site surveillance, monitoring, and
enforcement.
Upgrade regulation Issue implementation plan to bring Korea's prudential Issue regulations to extend, effective January l, 1999,
regulations closer to international practice as expressed in prudential rules applied to commercial banks to specialized
Basle Committee's 25 Core Principles for Effective Bank and development banks taking into account the special
Supervision (August 15). Plan will cover rules relating to characteristics of the institutions (November 15).
capital definition, loan classification, disclosure of trust Extend connected lending regulations that apply to
accounts, segregation of trust accounts and treatment of commercial banks to merchant banks. Adopt timetable for
trust accounts with guarantees as on-balance sheet items. reductions in connected lending limnits; connected lending
Submit legislation to amend the Act Concerning the audited and disclosed in amnual financial statements
Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry, inter (effective January 1, 1999).
alia, to redefine a "distressed" financial institution so as to Submit to National Assembly armendments to General
allow imposition of sanctions before actual insolvency and Banking Act, and similar act for merchant banks, to lower
to pe-nmit he full write down of shareholder equity single borrower and group exposure limits over time
(August 31). (October 31).
Improve troubled debt Issue guidelines by FSC for troubled debt restTucturing and
restructuring workout processes in banks, including best practice
regulations regarding treatment of Other Assets Owned
(including maximum holding periods, yearly valuations,
validation by third-parties, and write-downs, if necessary),
workout policies, and asset management plans (October).
Rationalize deposit insurance Rationalize deposit insurance scheme, including through
phasing out of general guarantee (ongoing).
Capital Market Devzelopmnent
Enhance functioning and Strengthen prudential rules for securities markets'
competitiveness of securities activities of all financial instituitionis, including
markets strengthening standards for internal risk management,
adoption of appropriate timetable for moving to mark-to
mnarket accounting for all financial institutions, and use o'
credit rating (August).
Develop implementation plans, with timetable to: i) Submit to National Assembly necessary chianges in
promote self-regulation, including through delegation of Securities and Exchange Law to enhancc the role of SROs
I ____________________ . _______ ____________________________ (D ecem ber 15). _________________De em ___
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increased regulatory and supervisory authority to self-regulatory
organizations (e.g., KSE, KSDA, KITCA); and ii) reform governance
structure of these SROs with the aim to promote their commercial
sensitivity and independence (September 15).
Develop implementation plan to liberalize trading systems, including
allowing for proprietary trading systems, and to strengthen clearing Announce key elements of action plans and achieve progress in
and settlement systems (September 15). implementation (December 15).
Develop bond markets As outcome of existing task force, create institutional setup to Announce key elements of action plan with appropriate timetable
formulate an action plan, with timetable, to develop bond markets to develop the bond market, including standardization of new
(primary and secondary), including: development of a (rolling) three- funding instruments and replacement of govemment-guaranteed
year plan for central government fmancing (including funding costs bonds with sovereign bonds (December 15).
associated with financial restructuring), standardization of new Institutionally strengthen Treasury-functions (December 15).
government and government agencies' funding instruments, and Introduce a framework to develop market-makers network,
consolidation of existing instruments (August). including adoption of minimum rules and time-table to select
primary dealers in government bonds, and authorize banks to act
as market-markers in govemment bonds (December 15).
Develop public asset-liability Initiate external debt management component of a comprehensive, Implement actions of agreed program on extemal debt
system integrated extemal and internal public asset-liability management management component and complete report detailing actions
system (ALM), supported by Bank TA-loan (August). with timetable to extend ALM to intemal debt and contingent
liability components (December 15).
Develop institutional investors Submit Securities Investment Company Act to allow, among others,
the establishment of mutual funds (August).
Submit legislation to allow asset-backed securities (August).
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors and actions
related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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Part A: Corporate Financial Restructuring
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
1. Developframework and capacity to
do voluntary corporate workouts
(a) Provide an overall framework of FSC provides guidelines on the following:
principles and procedures. - selection of corporate restructuring candidates;
- a Corporate Restructuring Agreement ("Agreement") to
provide a structure for creditor/debtor negotiations;
- creation and operation of a Corporate Restructuring
Coordination Committee ("Coordination Committee") to
resolve inter-creditor disputes; and
- "London rules" type principles to guide voluntary
corporate workouts (July).
FSC to monitor workouts under Agreement to ensure Continued monitoring of the implementation of the
consistency with the issued guidelines for workouts framework and guidelines.
(August).
(b) Assign responsibility for leading FSC identifies Lead Banks (July).
voluntary corporate workouts.
(c) Gain creditor support for approach FSC obtains adherence of major creditors to Corporate
to voluntary corporate workouts. Restructuring Agreement (July).
(d) Provide necessary professional Lead Banks to establish workout units (July).
resources for Lead Banks.
Lead Banks to retain internationally accredited advisors by
September 15.
(e) Provide means to resolve inter- Facilitated by FSC, banks to establish a Coordination
creditor disputes. Committee (July).
Coordination Committee to hire staff by August 15 and, as
necessary, retain internationally accredited advisors.
2. Provide policy supportfor
corporate restructuring
a) Curtail emergency loans. While fnancial institutions may provide new or additional Monitor observance of the guidelines.
loans to distressed but viable corporates as part of a
Corporate Restructuring Agreement workout, FSC will
provide guidelines for such lending by August 15. These
guidelines would includethe following:
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- GOK will refrain from directing the banks to make such
loans;
- the size of any loan would nornally be limited to the
shortfall needed to meet interest expense and trade payables
during the "standstill" period;
- in return, the debtor would facilitate complete access by
the Lead Bank's financial advisors (e.g., auditors) to the
debtor's records;
- during the standstill period, the Lead Bank's financial
advisors would assess the debtor's viability, review the
debtor's liabilities and cash flow projections, and - as
appropriate - value assets and indicate how best to
maximize the return to creditors - i.e., through voluntary
workout, composition, reorganization, or liquidation.
In exceptional cases, debtors due to be restructured, but not
currently in the workout process, will require new loans. In
such cases, if the banks are agreeable
to providing such loans they will be provided per the
guidelines noted above and for a maximum initial period of
six months.
(b) Facilitate use of debt/equity GOK will review if there are any tax disincentives and
conversions to address excessive regulatory impediments to the conversion of corporate debt
leverage among chaebol affiliates. into equity or near equity and will submit legislation to
National Assembly as necessary (September 15).
GOK will submit legislation to National Assembly on
mutual funds (August 30).
FSC will meet with experienced asset managers, corporate
turnaround experts, and investors in distressed securities
from the private sector to assess options for "corporate
restructuring vehicles" (CRVs). Privately financed and
managed, CRVs would purchase and/or manage corporate
equity acquired by fmancial institutions as a result of
debt/equity conversions. Key issues for FSC to discuss
with potential CRV managers would include appropriate
business forms for CRVs (e.g., partnerships, blind trusts,
stock funds) and potential tax, legal, and regulatory issues
(August).
GOK will identify legal, tax, and regulatory impediments - Based on this review, and if necessary, GOK will submit
if any - to the establishment of CRVs (September 15). legislation to the National Assembly enabling and
______________________________I_ regulating the formation of CRVs and removing tax, legal,
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and regulatory impediments to CRV formation and
operation (December 15).
(c) Reduce cross guarantees. FSC will encourage creditors to reduce cross guarantees Ongoing
through voluntary workouts conducted under the Corporate
Restructuring Agreement (August).
FSC will issue a communication to banks suggesting
market-based approaches for "buying out" cross guarantees.
These approaches could include, for example, conversion of
cross guarantees into guarantor's equity or equity warrants
or into a non-guaranteed loan at a higher interest rate
(August).
FSC will require fmiancial institutions to report on the stock
of guaranteed loans to the 64 chaebol as of June 30, 1998, FSC will establish appropriate internal interim benchmarks
by September 15; and ,starting with the fourth quarter of to monitor progress toward the reduction of cross guarantees
1998, FSC will require quarterly progress reports from (October).
banks on progress in reducing cross guarantees for the 64
chaebol (August 15).
(d) Provide additional encouragement GOK to submit to National Assembly proposed package of GOK will submit additional legislation to National
for corporate mergers and tax measures to encourage corporate M&As, asset sales and Assembly removing tax disincentives to corporate M&As,
acquisitions, debt restructuring, and debt restructuring (September 15). asset disposals, and debt restructuring (December 15).
asset dispositions as means of
corporate restructuring.
(e) Improve procedures and GOK will establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to MOJ will agree to announce, based on the review, its draft
coordination for court-supervised the Bank to review existing insolvency laws for further amendments to existing insolvency laws designed to
insolvency. improvement, focusing on expedited procedures (e.g., pre- promote expedited insolvency procedures for public hearing
packaged bankruptcies resulting from the workout process) and subsequent submission to the National Assembly by
(September 15). February 1999 (December 15).
FSC and MOJ, subject to agreement with the Supreme
Court, will establish a liaison committee comprising these
three entities to ensure prompt resolution of issues that
affect both voluntary restructuring and court-supervised
insolvency (September 15).
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3. Accelerate implementation of _
corporate restructuring
(a) Complete "triage" analysis. Lead Banks will complete their assessment of chaebol Monitor follow-up.
affiliates (including those from the top 5) that have received
"anti-bankruptcy" loans or which are on bank "watch" lists
and will indicate whether each is best suited for court
supervision, voluntary workout under the Corporate
Restructuring Agreement, or normal operation (July).
A special Task Force has been convened amongst four of
the Lead Banks to focus on a system for monitoring the top Monitor follow-up.
five chaebol. The Task Force will also examine the
workout programs of the top five chaebol. The Task Force
will complete its assessment by end-September.
(b) Pursue inter-creditor agreements, First Creditors Council meetings will be convened by each Ongoing
under the Business Restructuring of the Lead Banks under terms of the Agreement
Agreement, on corporates to be (July/August).
restructured.
FSC will direct each Lead Bank to provide monthly reports Ongoing
on the status of corporate workouts (September 15).
FSC will direct the Coordination Committee to provide
monthly reports to FSC on inter-creditor disputes and their
resolution (October).
(c) Pursue a timely exit strategy for the FSC will direct Lead Banks to stop new lending and Lead Banks to provide monthly reports to FSC on progress
55 non-viable corporates. withdraw existing loans for each of the 55 (July). in exiting the 55.
(d) Identify additional non-viable FSC will require monthly updates from Lead Banks on Ongoing
corporates. additional corporates identified as non-viable during the
course of Corporate Restructuring Agreement workouts
(August).
(e) Initiate resolution of corporates FSC will direct Lead Banks to send auditors into chaebol Monitor follow-up.
that are not under court supervision, affiliates that have received emergency loans - but which
but which have received emergency are not operating under court supervision - and give the
loans. auditors 60 days to review corporate liabilities, cash flow
projections, and asset values, assess viability, and indicate
how to maximize the return to creditors - e.g., through
voluntary workout, composition, reorganization, or
bankruptcy (August).
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(f) Expedite resolution of corporates KDB will invite international bids under transparent and Monitor next steps.
under court supervision in which the fair procedures for Kia (July). KFB will invite such bids
GOK is a major shareholder. for Hanbo by September.
(g) Develop an ability to anticipate FSC will establish a "situation room" to monitor
corporate default or insolvency. corporate/financial sector solvency (July).
(h) Promote self-restructuring by the FSC will provide guidelines to Lead Banks to strengthen Monitor implementation of the guidelines.
top 5 chaebol. the "capital structure improvement plans" of the top 5
chaebol, including decreases in debtlequity ratios, disposal
of non-viable affiliates, and reductions in cross guarantees
(July).
Fair Trade Commission will monitor and take actions Continued monitoring and enforcement.
against the top 5 chaebol that engage in anti-competitive
intra-group transactions (July).
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors
and actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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Part B: Corporate Governance, Competition Policies, and Reform and Privatization of SOEs
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Corporate Govemance
(a) Corporate Boards and
Shareholder Rights
Promote effective monitoring of Submit to National Assembly changes to the Commercial Enact the changes to the Commercial Code.
corporate performance. Code to impose on directors and "shadow" directors a duty
to act in the interests of the company.
Require listed companies to have a minimum of 25% of
their boards comprised of outside directors.
Submit to National Assembly legislation to further reduce Enact the legislation.
the thresholds for exercise of minority shareholder rights.
Establish a study team to provide a report and Completion of the report and submission of its
recommendations to Government on the introduction of recommendations to Government on the introduction of class
class action law suits. action law suits.
Establish a study team to provide a report and Complete the report, draft legislation to give effect to its
recommendations to Government on the role and functions recommendations, and announce a timetable acceptable to the
of boards of directors. Bank for submission to National Assembly.
Remove restrictions on the voting rights of institutional
investors in listed companies.
(b) Legal Frameworkfor Creditors'
Rights
Improve the insolvency system and Creation of bankruptcy commission to assist Seoul District
strengthen capacity to handle Court by handling aspects of insolvency litigation.
bankruptcy cases.
Appoint a task force comprising representatives of the Establish a pilot specialist bankruptcy court in Seoul with
judiciary and MOJ under TORs acceptable to the Bank to dedicated judges.
study the speedy adjudication of bankruptcy cases,
including the establishment of one or more specialist
bankruptcy courts.
Facilitate lending to SMEs through Establish a Task Force to design a modern system for secured
irnproved tools for secured lending. lending on movables and a national registry system. The Task
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Force to complete its work and make its recommendations by
December 15.
(c) Financial Transparency and
Accountability
Rationalize the institutional Establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to the Bank Complete the review and remove all directives affecting
framework for setting standards, to review and recommend revisions to relevant laws and accounting and auditing standards and practices by various
regulating and overseeing the regulations to: rationalize the role of various government government agencies including the Bank Supervisory Board and
accounting and auditing profession. agencies in supervising the accounting and auditing Insurance Supervisory Board and consolidate appropriate
profession; strengthen the role of KICPA as a self- regulatory responsibility in the Securities Supervisory Board.
regulating body consistent with international best practice; Adopt and announce an implementation plan acceptable to the
and develop an implementation plan for establishing an Bank for the establishment of an independent accounting
independent accounting standard setting organization. standard setting organization by June 1999.
Commitment to establish an independent accounting
standard setting organization by June 1999. Submit to National Assembly amendments to applicable laws
and regulations to give effect to the recommendations of the
Task Force, including changes in CPA Law, External Audit
Law, and Securities and Exchange Law.
Strengthen KICPA and make it - Establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to Bank to: Complete the review and adopt a time-bound implementation
independent of government and the review and strengthen KICPA's charter, operational plan satisfactory to the Bank: Begin implementation of
primary source of guidance in structure and capacity; assess the appropriateness of rules recommended changes in rules and regulations. Submit to
auditing. and regulations on auditing including maximum audit fee, National Assembly amendments to applicable laws.
numerical restrictions based on CPA head count, minimum
audit contract period, evaluation of audit fims by
government, and allocation of audit clients by government;
and strengthen KICPA's role in issuing auditing standards,
monitoring professional quality, enhancing professional
ethics and enforcing the code of conduct.
Upgrade accounting and auditing Adoption and issuance by FSC of improved accounting and
standards to make them consistent auditing standards for fnancial institutions, listed companies
with international best practice, and joint stock companies consistent with international best
requiring that financial statements of practice and prepared with participation of representatives of
companies and fmancial institutions internationally recognized accounting fnmns, and institution and
be prepared in accordance with these announcement of the requirement that fmancial statements of
improved standards with effect from financial institutions, listed companies, and joint stock
the 1999 reporting year, as agreed companies with assets in excess of W7 billion will be prepared
under SAL I. and audited in accordance with these standards from fiscal year
1999. The improved accounting standards will include, inter
alia, standards covering financial instruments, leases, asset,
classification, troubled debt restructuring, asset revaluation,
translation of foreign currencies, loss and income recognition,
financial statement disclosure, and combined financial
statements.
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Improve the fmancial oversight role Complete the study on introduction of audit committees of
of boards of directors and enhance boards of directors and improvement of the effectiveness
the effectiveness of the internal audit of the internal audit function for listed companies and
function. fmancial institutions under TORs acceptable to the Bank,
as agreed under SAL 1.
Appoint a Task Force under TORs agreed with the Bank Completion of the review. Adoption and announcement of an
to: review and rationalize the function of the audit implementation plan and schedule acceptable to the Bank for the
selection committee to make it an independent and institution of a requirement for the establishment by listed
transparent entity and develop an implementation plan to companies of audit committees of boards of directors, and
upgrade it to an audit committee of boards of directors, completion of a draft of necessary changes in laws and
taking into account the conclusions of the above study; regulations to give effect to this requirement.
and recommend changes in relevant laws and regulations.
Improve the quality and frequency of Require listed companies to publish quarterly fmancial
fmnancial reporting by listed statements with adequate disclosure consistent with
companies. intemational best practice starting in 2000 Ql.
Competition Policies
Increase competition across all Complete draft of amendments to Fair Trade Act (FTA), Enact the amendments.
sectors. acceptable to the Bank, based on recommendations of the
Joint Public/Private Sector Committee.
Commitment to fully enforce provisions of the FTA in the KFTC to provide the Bank with a detailed report and analysis of
restructuring of chaebols in accordance with the policy all cases of chaebol M&A, divestiture and restructuring notified
statement issued under SAL I. and considered prior to the second tranche release, in a format
agreed with the Bank.
Enact the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels.
Review and propose revisions as required to the GOK
procurement guidelines to assure transparency, and limit
opportunities for collusion and corruption.
Issue and implement comprehensive M&A guidelines. Monitor compliance, especially in chaebol restructuring.
Strengthen the enforcement of rules Apply existing laws stringently and uniformly, and propose
limiting transactions between related amendments to the FTA to further limit such transactions.
corporations, companies, fmancial
institutions, their owners, directors,
shareholders and employees.
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Establish a more transparent Enact legislation, satisfactory to the Bank, modifying
framework for corporate group rights restrictions under the FTA on the creation of holding company
and obligations. - structures so as to permit such structures subject to conditions to
avoid undue ownership concentration.
Strengthen the operational capacity mplement the agreed work plan for the Policy Analysis Develop detailed KFTC operational guidelines (e.g.,
of KFTC. and Evaluation Group. investigative guidelines) and achieve satisfactory progress in
implementing an appropriate upgrading program.
Further deregulate domestic industry Complete submissions to the Deregulation Committee on Achieve satisfactory progress in implementing necessary
to promote competition. regulatory barriers in different industries. legislative or regulatory changes.
Promote foreign direct investment. Enact the Foreign Investment Promotion Act. Implement the new Act (simplification of procedures, improved
support system).
Support competition in domestic Review customs clearance and product Achieve satisfactory progress in implementing the streamlining
industry by easing import certification/registration procedures and develop a plan to plan.
requirements and administration. streamline them.
Reform and Privatization of SOEs
(a) SOE Restructuring and
Governance Reforms
Ensure that SOEs that are to remain Review the Basic Law on Management of "State- Submit to National Assembly legislation to improve the
under state control or are to be Capitalized" Enterprises in order to improve management management structure of SOEs.
privatized gradually, operate in an structure of such SOEs, including the allocation of policy,
efficient and accountable manner. regulatory and ownership functions.
(b) General Privatization Program
Ensure that the Government's Announce a program of privatization, including Submit any necessary privatization legislation, including
proposed privatization and SOE identification of SOEs to be offered for sale, extent of amendments to the privatization law, to National Assembly.
reform program is implemented within proposed share or asset sales and, as appropriate, proposed
a sound framework. methods and target schedule for the completion of such
proposed sales. Establish a steering committee, supported
by task forces, to oversee implementation of the
privatization program. Review need for any enabling
legislation.
(c) Infrastructure Sectors
Improve regulatory and institutional Adopt and announce an overall strategy acceptable to the Satisfactory progress in implementing the privatization and SOE
framework for increased private Bank for dealing with structural, regulatory and reform program in infrastructure sectors in accordance with the
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participation in the provision of institutional issues in privatization and SOE reform in principles included in the strategy statement.
infrastructure services. infrastructure sectors, including, inter alia, the priority to
be given to transition toward more competitive market
structures and establishment of appropriate regulatory
structures, and sequencing of structural, regulatory and
ownership reforms.
Undertake a study on reforms to the regulatory and
institutional framework for involving private participants Announce key elements of proposed reforms.
in greenfield infrastructure projects.
Telecommunications Undertake a study on reforms to pricing, interconnection Announce key elements of proposed reforms, including
and universal service arrangements, and the establishment timetable for implementing those reforms, prior to any further
of an independent regulatory authority. privatization of KT and, in any case, before December 15.
Power Undertake a study on structural and regulatory reforms in Announce key elements of proposed structural and regulatory
the power sector, including the establishment of an reforms, including timetable for implementing those reforms.
independent regulatory authority.
Undertake a study on structural and regulatory reforms in Announce preliminary findings of the study by December 15.
Gas the gas sector, including the establishment of an Announce key elements of proposed structural and regulatory
independent regulatory authority. reforms, including timetable for implementing those reforms,
before proceeding with the privatization of KOGAS.
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors and
actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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Integration of Social Policy Reform Agenda
Improve the framework for the design and Commitment to clearly mandate and adequately Establishment of a Working-Level Committee under the National
coordination of social safety net policies. staff the National Committee on Social Security Committee on Social Security, anchored in the Prime Minister's
chaired by the Prime Minister, to coordinate cross- Office and provided with adequate professional staff capacity, to
cutting reforms in social policies in order to serve as a focal point.
achieve coherence across concerned ministries and Complete interim assessment report on cost-effectiveness of
agencies. integrating contributions to social risk management funds for
pensions, medical insurance and unemployment insurance,
including: (a) collection mechanisms; (b) contribution base
determination; and (c) cross-checking features.
Complete interim assessment report on the aggregate payroll tax
and labor market implications of adjustments in coverage and
contribution rates for pensions, medical insurance and
unemployment insurance.
Social Protection for Workers
Expand sustainable coverage of income support Extend Ul to firms with fewer than 5 workers and Adjust contribution rates if necessary in order to maintain
provided by the unemployment insurance (Ut) to temporary and part-time workers with effect financial viability of UI scheme for FY99 given anticipated
component of the Employment Insurance Scheme from October 1998. unemployment rate and any changes in benefit structure (per
(EIS). Commitment to maintain actuarial integrity of the SAL I agreement).
UI scheme, i.e. positive financial reserves, and
zero leakage to other programs (per SAL I
agreement).
Increase employment by enhancing labor market Commitment to implement fully the layoff Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, on
flexibility. provisions of the 1998 Labor Standards Act so as enhancement of labor market flexibility.
to remove undue labor market impediments to
efficient corporate restructuring. Complete report providing recommendations for appropriate
expansion of public employment services without crowding out
private employment services.
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improve efficiency of active labor market Commitment to limit expenditure on ES and Complete interim evaluation report on the cost-effectiveness of ES
programs by eliminating cost-ineffective programs VAD programs by containing contribution rates and VAD programs (per SAL I agreement).
provided under the employment security (ES) and at or below current levels (0.3% for ES and Hold national workshop with stakeholders to discuss the interim
vocational ability development (VAD) components averaging 0.4% for VAD) and maintaining evaluation report.
of EIS. positive fnancial reserves. Commitment not to Disseminate the interim evaluation report.
provide budget subsidies that increase the scope Announce policy adjustments to eliminate ES and VAD programs
of ES and VAD activities beyond self-financed found to be cost-ineffective
operations.
Commitment not to expand coverage of ES and
VAD programs any further.
Finalize TOR acceptable to the Bank and initiate
formal evaluation of cost-effectiveness of ES and
VAD programs
Protecting the Poor
Expand provision of workfare for the unemployed Implement expanded Phase 11 of the temporary Allocate adequate FY99 budget to absorb supply of labor
who are not insured. public works program at wage levels designed to forthcoming for public works at targeted wage levels (not higher
target the poor jobless by self-selection. than Phase II in real terms).
Restrict participation to the unemployed who are Relax capacity constraints on workfare expansion by involving
not currently eligible to receive UI benefits. NGO and private sector contractors.
Expand provision of means-tested noncontributory Commitment to expand budget allocation in Allocate adequate FY99 budget.
income support for the poor. FY99 to the temporary noncontributory means-
tested allowance for the unemployed poor in line
with increases in the eligible target group.
Commitment to expand budget allocation in Allocate adequate FY99 budget.
FY99 to workfare and other forms of income
support for able-bodied beneficiaries of "self-
support" under the livelihood protection program
for the poor.
Maintain real expenditure per eligible beneficiary Initiate analytical report assessing trends in the Complete the two reports by October 30.
on existing livelihood protection programs for the 1998 inflation rate adjusted for consumption Allocate adequate FY99 budget taking into account: (a)
poor (self-support, home care and institutional care patterns of poor households. adjustment of nominal per capita benefits to compensate for
programs). Initiate analytical report assessing 1998 trends in inflation among the poor; and (b) adjustment of total budget to
the number and characteristics of people living in absorb increased number of eligible poor.
poor households.
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Strengthen information base for regular poverty Implement special National Survey of Hold national workshop to review design options for a regular
monitoring and analysis. Employment Assistance and Welfare Needs of national multipurpose household survey, including a panel
the Unemployed (KIHASA/KLI/NSO subsample, incorporating comprehensive data on household
collaboration). welfare and coverage of government programs.
Assign institutional responsibility for Complete feasibility report for introducing a regular national
coordinating interagency inputs to design of an multipurpose household survey, including questionnaire design,
integrated multipurpose national household sample size, field operations, policy analysis and institutional
survey. responsibilities.
Financial Risk Management for Health
Improve efficiency of financial intermediation by Complete prospective assessment report on cost- Implement consolidation plan for insurance societies under SEMI.
public sector health insurers through reducing the effectiveness of alternative options for
unit costs of administration per insured under the consolidation of the fragmented insurance
national Medical Insurance System (MIS). societies belonging to Self-Employed Medical
Insurance (SEMI) component of MIS.
Commitment to incorporate the financial
operations of MIS into the consolidated fiscal
accounting framework of the published
Government Finance Statistics for the public
sector, beginning with FY99 fiscal accounts.
Strengthen supply-side incentives for efficient Commitment to implement a universal reforrn of In consultation with the Bank, announce a detailed timetable for
provision of medical care. the provider payment system to improve cost implementation of the provider payment reform plan beginning
containment incentives based on DRG-based with the year 2000.
pricing.
Improve demand-side protection against major Commitment to significantly reduce by FY2000 Adopt and announce key elements of the coinsurance reform plan,
financial risks for MIS beneficiaries and for poor the effective coinsurance rate for hospital both for MIS and Medicaid, including the timetable for
Medicaid beneficiaries by reducing out-of-pocket inpatient care, combined with an income-related implementation beginning with FY2000.
copayments. catastrophic cap, both for MIS and .Medicaid.
Initiate preparation of a coinsurance reform plan,
both for MIS and Medicaid, including
adjustments to special treatment changes,
inclusion of noncovered services, and reallocation
of health insurance coverage from minor to major
risks.
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Commitment to harmonize Medicaid provider Commitment to allocate adequate FY2000 budget to implement
reimbursement levels with MIS. provider reimbursement reform for Medicaid beneficiaries.
Implement an official investigation of leakages of Complete investigation report and initiate implementation of its
allocated budget funds from reaching poor recommendations.
beneficiaries of the Medicaid program.
Diversify policy instruments for pooling financial In consultation with the Bank, finalize TORs and Hold public workshop to review findings and recommendations of
risks of medical care. initiate evaluation report on introduction of assessment report on introduction of MSAs.
individual medical savings accounts (MSAs) to
finance intermediate financial risks associated
with medical care.
Social Protection for the Elderly
Mitigate impact of the economic crisis on living Initiate analytical report assessing the Complete the analytical report and allocate adequate FY99 budget
standards of the elderly. effectiveness of the means-tested noncontributory for the social pension to achieve effective coverage of the poor
"social pension" for elderly aged over 65 in terms elderly target group.
of coverage of the target group, and prevention of
poverty among recipients.
Improve transparency and governance of fmancial Commitment to establish an Office or function of Establish the Office/function of the Actuary.
operations of all public pension schemes (NPS and the Actuary in the Office of the Prime Minister Allocate adequate FY99 budget to prepare and publish the first
occupational schemes for civil servants, teachers responsible for annual projections of the long- annual status report for FY98.
and military). termi actuarial status of all public pension
schemes based on consistent macroeconomic and
demographic assumptions.
Commitment to incorporate the financial
operations of the Teachers and Civil Servants
pension schemes into the consolidated fiscal
accounting framework of the published
Government Finance Statistics for the public
sector, beginning with FY99 fiscal accounts.
Develop an integrated pension reform proposal that Finalize TORs acceptable to the Bank governing Establish the Government Task Force by October 1998 (per SAL I
fully recognizes and rationalizes the mandatory the structure, composition and mandate of the agreement). Commitment to complete draft White Paper no later
public and private components of the existing Government Task Force responsible for the than November 1999 (with background papers completed by June
pension system. planned comprehensive White Paper on Pension 1999) on an integrated pension reform package combining
Reform (per SAL I agreement). public/private and mandatory/voluntary pensions pillars designed
to attain: (a) a reasonable replacement rate target for the average
worker; (b) reasonable protection from poverty for the aged; and
(c) long-term financial sustainability. Completion of progress
_______________________________________ 
report on the work program of the Task Force. I
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Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Achieve more efficient allocation of National Adopt and announce a timetable for Implement the phased reduction of forced government appropriations
Pension Fund (NPF) assets. implementation of the reduction in forced from NPF agreed with the Bank, through adoption of legislation
government appropriation of the flow of NPF satisfactory to the Bank, including necessary revisions to the Public
surpluses (per SAL I agreement) as follows: Fund Management Act.
65% of the NPF surplus flow in 1999, 40% Implement plan to strengthen the professional investment unit in the
in 2000, 20% in 2001 and 0% in 2002. National Pension Corporation (per SAL I agreement), including: (a)
Announce that the stock of outstanding loans achievement of a high standard of staff qualifications and supporting
to government from NPF will be repaid in technology; and (b) adequate resources to monitor external fund
full at maturity without rollovers. managers.
In consultation with the Bank, announce Announce a schedule acceptable to the Bank for contracting out asset
specific guidelines for governance of NPF management and implement plan to increase gradually and
reserves, including: (a) the task of the asset substantially the share of NPS assets outsourced to external fund
management committee; (b) investment rules managers (per SAL I agreement), including: (a) increased unit amount
and rating procedures; (c) benchmarking and outsourced per external fund manager in order to attract interest of
reporting mechanism; and (d) index-based reputable firms; and (b) adoption of revised criteria for selecting and
criteria for selecting external fund managers. recontracting external fund managers to reflect diversification of
investment risks.
Commitment to: (a) phase out per agreed timetable all lending from
NPF to program participants using their contributions as collateral;
and (b) refrain from providing fmancial assistance from NPF to
restructuring of financially distressed corporations
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors and
actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
